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MARK R. BROWN*
Campaign finance reform and term limits are in vogue today, but both
have serious constitutional wrinkles. A fairly easy pill to swallow, and one that
ought to have a moderate term limit effect, is reducing ballot access
requirements. Many states today charge candidates thousands of dollars to
have their names placed on primary ballots. Others require that candidates
collect thousands of signatures. Conventional wisdom has it that these
restrictions are necessary to "winnow" the ballots by screening out frivolous
candidates. In this Article, using empirical data gathered from the 1994 and
1996 congressional elections, Professor Brown shows that these restrictions do
not have the intended effect: charging thousands of dollars in fees or requiring
thousands of supportive signatures does not deter frivolous candidates from
running for office.
This Article urges Congress to pass uniform ballot access requirements for
congressional elections. States should be allowed some room to fashion their
own requirements, but should not be allowed to exceed specific fee or signature
limits. Professor Brown argues that the benefits of these measures would be
many, including greater voter turnout, increased political competition,
enhanced governmental accountability, and a more egalitarian electoral
process. Ballots will remain manageable and voters will make informed
choices. Meanwhile, only states' pocketbooks will suffer. And that, according
to Professor Brown, is the price offree elections.
All quarters today agree that America's political image needs polish. Voter
turnout is low across the United States, money is king, and influence peddling
runs rampant. The problem is how to fix it. Two immediate solutions have
taken center stage: first, campaign finance reform,' and second, legislative term
limits.2 Campaign spending limitations and abbreviated tenure, however, offer
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CIV-T-23A (M.D. Fla. filed June 12, 1996) (challenging on First and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds primary ballot access requirements in Florida's Tenth Congressional
District). I thank Jack McCloskey, Roy Gardner, Bobbi Flowers, Mike Finch, Mike
Swygert, Richard Gershon, Les Scharf and Bob Batey for their thoughts and criticisms, and
the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc. for sponsoring the challenge
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1 See, e.g., Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical
Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REy. 1160 (1994) (arguing
for public financing of congressional campaigns).
2 Between 1990 and the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), which invalidated term limits, twenty-two states passed laws
restricting congressional incumbency. See Sean R. Sullivan, Comment, A Term Limit by Any
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few constitutionally acceptable answers. The Supreme Court has largely
divested the states and Congress of power over campaign spending,3 as well as
congressional term limits. 4 If change is to be had, it likely is to take a different
path.
History teaches that meaningful reform is often the result of minor
adjustments and tinkerings. In this spirit, this Article offers a small calibration
to America's political machinery: "Thou shalt not ration the ballot." 5 Placing
one's name on the electoral ballot is one of the most noble civic acts in a
republican society. Unfortunately, this front door to government is closed to
most Americans. Ballots across the country suffer a dearth of palatable
candidates, not only because running against highly leveraged incumbents is
seen as futile, but also because ballot access is too often laden with imposing
hoops and hurdles.
Federal candidates, in particular, are routinely subjected to restrictions
beyond the age, citizenship and residence qualifications spelled out by Article I
of the Constitution.6 Because the Constitution delegates initial regulatory
authority to the states,7 exact procedures and conditions vary around the nation.
Other Name?: The Constitutionality of State-Enacted Ballot Access Restrictions on Incumbent
Members of Congress, 56 U. PnT. L. REv. 845, 846 (1995).
3 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits
campaign spending limits); see also Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal
Elections Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996) (First Amendment prohibits limits placed on
independent expenditures made by parties).
4 See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that states cannot
impose qualifications additional to those prescribed by Article I); Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486 (1969) (holding that Congress cannot impose qualifications additional to those
prescribed by Article I's requirements of age, residence and citizenship). States presumably
remain free to impose term limits on local legislative officers. But see Bates v. Jones, 904 F.
Supp. 1080 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding term limits for state offices unconstitutional under First
and Fourteenth Amendments), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Uhler v. Bates, 1997 WL
629803 (9th Cir. 1997).
5 Compare Learned Hand's remonstrance: "If we are to keep our democracy there must
be one commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice." Judge Learned Hand, Thou Shalt Not
Ration Justice, Address at the 75th Anniversary Dinner of the Legal Aid Society of New
York (Feb. 16, 1951), in TE LEGAL Am BREF CAsE, April 1951, at 3, 5.
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("No person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.");
id. § 3 ("No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years,
and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.").
7 See id. § 4 (states given authority to define "Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives"). Although Congress has the power to overnule
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Most states, however, share a common characteristic by requiring that major
parties conduct primaries.8 Winners then face off in general elections. 9
The primary system is, by itself, unobjectionable. The general election
ballot ought to be limited to those candidates who have shown some modicum
of preliminary support. Party primaries fill the part. Those candidates who wish
to run without participating in primaries can fairly be required to make a
surrogate showing of support, something that roughly equates with the rigors of
these regulations, see id., it has for the most part refused to intervene. Current congressional
regulations require only that certain "covered" jurisdictions "preclear" changes in their
political systems. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). The majority of states may alter ballot
access restrictions without satisfying the preclearance requirements of section 1973c. See
generally Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996) (discussing preclearance
of changes to primaries and conventions). Of course, a state's regulation of ballot access must
comply with constitutional safeguards, such as the Fifteenth Amendment, see, e.g., City of
Mobile v. Bolded, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (recognizing that racial discrimination in voting laws
violates Fifteenth Amendment), and cannot otherwise discriminate in violation of federal
voting rights laws. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994) (prohibiting dilution of minority voting
rights). These topics fall beyond the scope of this Article.
8 See Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1199-1200 ("[M]ost states [have] effectively divided [their]
election into two stages, the first consisting of the selection of party candidates and the second
being the general election itself."). Only four states fall outside this model. Virginia allows
parties to choose either primaries or conventions. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-509(A) (Michie
1993). Connecticut, New Mexico and Utah condition primaries on results in pre-primary
conventions. Primaries are only held if more than one candidate at the convention receives a
significant modicum of support. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-381 to 9450 (West 1989
& Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-33 (Michie 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-403
(1995). In New Mexico, candidates gain access to pre-primary party ballots by supplying
signatures from a number of party members equal to 2% of the party's voters for governor in
the district in the last election. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-33.B (Michie 1978). A candidate
who then fails to receive the needed support at the pre-primary convention can still gain
access to the primary ballot by collecting signatures from an additional 2% of the party's
voters for governor in the district in the last election. See id. § 1-8-33.C.
9 Access to the general election is, for the most part, conditioned on success in
primaries. Minor parties and independent candidates are allowed access to the general election
ballot if they demonstrate some specified modicum of support, like collecting signatures from
a stated percentage of the electorate. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.0955(1) & (2) (West
1996) (stating that independent candidates may have their names placed on the general ballot
if supported by signatures from 3 % of registered voters in the district). Write-in candidates
are also often allowed, see, e.g., id. § 99.061(3)(a), though states can exclude them
completely. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (finding no constitutional right to
be a write-in candidate). Experience teaches, however, that only major party candidates have
a true chance of winning federal elections. Only one Representative not affiliated with either
the Republican or Democratic parties currently sits in the House of Representatives. None are
in the Senate.
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a primary.10 But what of running in the primary itself? Is it necessary to
condition primary access on some significant demonstration of "seriousness" or
support? Granted, something can be said for deterring "frivolous" candidates
and maintaining meaningful elections. But are fees ranging from hundreds to
thousands of dollars, or requiring thousands of voters' signatures, really
necessary?
This Article studies the affect of fee and signature requirements on party
primaries and voter choice. Because the United States House of Representatives
offers frequent elections and a rich variety of data and practices, I have chosen
it as the relevant exemplar for study. I believe, however, that my specific
findings have a more general appeal. My basic conclusion is that primary
ballots across the United States are over-regulated. Empirical evidence gathered
from the 1994 and 1996 congressional primaries reveals that nominal fee and
signature requirements tend to limit primaries, on average, to fewer than three
candidates. Because even a relatively unregulated political market can be
expected to maintain a manageable number of candidates, little is gained by
imposing large fee and signature requirements. De-regulation (and
popularization) of the ballot access laws across the United States is in order.
Also considered is the impact of popular primaries on general elections.
General election data from 1994 and 1996 reveal that incumbents uniformly
prospered in congressional elections. Although incumbents' success rates
decreased with greater ballot access, they did not descend below historic levels.
Like it or not, incumbents win, and win often, regardless of primary ballot
restrictions. Still, incumbents' success rates were significantly lower in those
states with more candidates and greater access. A marginal term limit effect
might therefore be realized by opening the ballot. Although open access will
not systemically rout incumbents from office, it offers a likelihood of increased
freshman representation.
I. THE LAW OF BALLOT AccEss RESTRICTIONS
Typical ballot access restrictions for political primaries include filing fees
and petition/signature requirements. While about one-third of the states rely
solely on signature collection,11 a majority today use filing fees as the principal
10 This normally takes the form of a signature drive, which, again, appears
unobjectionable.
11 Sixteen states use signatures as opposed to fees to restrict primary access. See ARiz.
CoNsT. art. VII, § 14 (no filing fee for any office); COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-801(2)(b) (1980
& Supp. 1996) (no filing fee; qualify by petition with signatures); 10 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN.
5/7-10(b) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (no filing fee; qualify by petition with signatures); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 43.20.3 (West 1991) (no filing fee; qualify by petition with signatures); ME.
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limitation on ballot access. 12 Some of these, like Alabama, Alaska, Maryland,
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 335.5.C (West 1993) (no filing fee; qualify by petition with
signatures); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 53, § 6 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1997) (no filing fee;
qualify by petition with signatures); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 168.133 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1997) (no filing fee; qualify by petition with signatures); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:23-8
(West 1989) (no fee required; qualify by petition with signatures); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-33
(Michie 1978) (no fee required; qualify by petition with signatures); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-
136.2(g) (MeKinney 1978 & Supp. 1997) (no fee required; qualify by petition with
signatures); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-06 (1991) (no fee required; qualify by petition with
signatures); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-14-7(b) (1996) (no fee required; qualify by petition with
signatures); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-6-7 (Michie 1995) (no fee required; qualify by petition
with signatures); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-5-101(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (no fee required;
qualify by petition with signatures); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2355(1) (1982) (no fee
required; qualify by petition with signatures); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8.15(6)(b) (West 1996) (no
fee required; qualify by petition with signatures). Five states, Hawaii, Kentucky, Ohio,
Pennsylvania and Virginia, currently require both fees and signatures. See HAw. REv. STAT.
§§ 12-5(a) & 12-6(b)(1) (1993) ($75 fee and 25 signatures); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 118.125(2) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996) ($500 fee and 2 signatures); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 3513.10(A) & (B) (Anderson 1996) ($85 fee and 50 signatures); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
25, § 2872.1 (West 1994) (signatures from 1000 party members plus $150 filing fee); VA.
CODE ANN. § 24.2-253 (Michie 1993) (fee equal to 2% of annual salary and signatures from
1/2 of 1% of registered voters in district). Idaho required 500 signatures and a $150 fee in
1994, but in 1996 required the payment of a $300 fee or alternatively collection of 500
signatures. See 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 28 (codified at IDAFIO CODE §§ 34-605 & 34-626
(Supp. 1997)) (raising fee to $300 and allowing 500 signatures as alternative). Connecticut
uses conventions to determine who participates in party primaries, if any. See FEDERAL
ELEIONs COMM'N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 96, ELECION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT,
THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOuSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 91 (1997) [hereinafter "1996
ELECTIONS REPORT"] ("A candidate endorsed by the party at the party convention is the
nominee. If a qualified challenger to the party endorsed candidate receives 15% of the
delegate vote on roll call at the convention, a primary election is held between the two
candidates."). The District of Columbia, which has not been included in this study, also uses
signatures to restrict access to its congressional ballot. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1312(i)(1)(B)
(1981) (no filing fee; qualify by petition with signatures).
12 See ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.050(a) (Michie 1996) ($100 filing fee for House); CAL.
ET.c. CODE § 8104(b) (West 1996) (1% of annual salary); HAw. REv. STAT. § 12-6(b)(1)
(1993) ($75 filing fee for House); IDAHO CODE § 34-605(4) (Supp. 1997) ($300 filing fee for
House); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-206(a) (1993) (1% of annual salary); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 118.255(1) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996) ($500 filing fee for House); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:464.B(1) & C (West Supp. 1997) ($600 filing fee for House and up to $300 assessment
by party); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 4A-6(c) (1997) ($100 filing fee); MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 204B.11(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997) ($300 filing fee); Miss. CODEANN. § 23-15-297(b) (1990
& Supp. 1997) ($200 filing fee); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.357.1(1) (West 1997) ($100 filing
fee); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-10-202(3) (1993) (1% of annual salary); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 32-608(2) & (5) (Supp. 1996) (1% of annual salary and waiver for indigence); NEv. REv.
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Nebraska and Utah, provide waivers for candidates who cannot afford fees.' 3
Most, however, do not waive fees, but instead allow alternative access through
petition/signature mechanisms. 14 These alternatives allow potential candidates
to gather a specified number of voters' signatures, usually from registered party
members residing in the district, in place of paying fees. Only one state,
Indiana, eschews both fees and signatures in favor of free and open House
primaries.' 5
A. Constitutional Challenges
Whether fees or signatures,' 6 ballot restrictions are subject to two principal
constitutional challenges. First, they interfere with political and associational
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. A potential candidate has a
STAT. ANm. § 293.193.1 (Michie 1995) ($300 filing fee); N.H. REV. SrAT. ANN. §§ 655:19
& 655:19-c.I(b) (1996) ($5000 filing fee, but only $50 if candidate agrees to campaign
spending limits).
13 See ALA. CODE § 17-16-15 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 15.050(a) (Michie 1996); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 33, § 4A-6(c) (1997); NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-608(2) & (5) (Supp. 1996);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-201(6)(a)(ii) (1995).
14 A few states continue to impose fees without expressly providing for alternative
access mechanisms. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118.125(2) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996)
($500 fee together with two signatures); Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-297(b) (1990 & Supp.
1997) ($200 fee); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.193.1 (Michie 1995) ($300 filing fee); OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 3513.10(A) & (B) (Anderson 1996) ($85 fee together with 50 signatures);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 2872.1 & 2873.1 (West 1994) ($150 fee together with 1000
signatures); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996) (fee equal to 1% of
congressional salary); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-208(a)(ii) (Michie 1997) ($200 fee). To the
extent these fees exceed administrative costs, they are of questionable validity under Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), and Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974). See infra notes
24-34 and accompanying text.
15 Although Indiana has no restrictions on access to the House of Representatives,
candidates for the United States Senate must produce 5000 signatures. See IND. CODE ANN.
§ 3-8-2-8(a) (West 1997) (no fee or signatures needed for House; signatures of 5000 voters
needed to support ballot access for U.S. Senate).
16 Challenges have more often been brought to fee requirements, though it is clear that
signature requirements might also prove unconstitutionally burdensome. See, e.g.,
Rockefeller v. Powers, 917 F. Supp. 155 (E.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 78 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996)
(striking down requirement that candidates for presidential primary collect signatures from
1250 voters or 5% of registered party members); Johnston v. Luna, 338 F. Supp. 355 (N.D.
Tex. 1972) (striking down Texas alternative requiring signatures from voters "equal to 10
percent of the entire vote cast for that party's candidate for governor in the last preceding
election"); cf Bullock, 405 U.S. at 141-42 n.17 ("[W]e intimate no view on the merits of
[the Luna] controversy.").
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constitutional right to associate with the party of his choosing, at least if the
party will have him.17 State laws that block or limit primary ballot access run
head long into both the candidate's associational interests and the rights of the
party's members. Importantly, associational rights are at their highest peak
when the state regulates party primaries. While the American experience proves
that political parties' selection methods warrant regulation,' 8 no one will deny
the relevance of the First Amendment.19
Second, because ballot access and voting are fundamental rights,
restrictions and classifications raise equal protection concerns. This is
particularly true of filing fees, which tend to treat affluent candidates differently
from those of more modest means.20 Even signature requirements can be so
debilitating that equal protection becomes a problem. 21 The classic example is a
petition alternative requiring thousands of signatures, which tends to benefit
17 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557 (1995) (holding that parade organizers have a First Amendment right to exclude groups
from parade).
18 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that party rules excluding
blacks violate Fifteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (same).
19 See, e.g., Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 (1992) ("[T]he constitutional right of
citizens to create and develop new political parties ... advances the constitutional interest of
like-minded voters to gather in pursuit of common political ends .... ."); Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (striking down state election law that
prohibited political parties from endorsing candidates in primaries and regulated parties
internal affairs); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (holding closed
primary statute unconstitutional). Compare Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 116 S. Ct.
1186, 1216 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting), in which Justice Scalia stated:
[We have always treated government assertion of control over the internal affairs of
political parties-which, after all, are simply groups of like-minded individual voters-as
a matter of the utmost constitutional consequence. What is at issue in this case,
therefore, is not merely interpretation of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c, but, inextricably bound up with that interpretation, the First Amendment
freedom of political association.
Id. (citations omitted).
20 See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 273, 287 (1993) ("When the costs of running for office interfere with
political candidacy and meaningful participation on the basis of wealth, equal protection
requires close judicial scrutiny of the arrangement.").
21 See, e.g., Rockefeller v. Powers, 917 F. Supp. 155 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 78 F.3d 44
(2d Cir. 1996) (striking down requirement that candidates for presidential primary collect
signatures from 1250 voters or 5% of registered party members).
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incumbents and wealthy candidates who can afford to hire canvassers.
22
Though not involving any suspect class, the fundamental nature of running for
office causes courts to apply heightened scrutiny. 23
The Supreme Court has applied these principles to political primaries on
two occasions. In Bullock v. Caner,24 the Court struck down a Texas law that
required all candidates to pay a filing fee in order to run in the state's primaries.
Fees varied with the office, but all shared a common characteristic-they were
substantial.2 5 Applying heightened scrutiny, the Court unanimously concluded
in Bullock that Texas's excessive filing fees violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a real and appreciable impact on
the exercise of the franchise, and because this impact is related to the resources
of the voters supporting a particular candidate, we conclude.., that the laws
must be "closely scrutinized" and found reasonably necessary to the
accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in order to pass constitutional
muster. 26
The state's asserted justifications-first, insuring that only serious candidates
22 The Court has held that candidates have a First Amendment right to hire canvassers to
collect signatures. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
23 An argument might also be made that filing fees for federal office violate section 6 of
Article I of the United States Constitution, which provides that states cannot alter the salary
for federal office. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6 (Congress sets salary for federal elected office).
One might argue that large fees diminish congressional salaries. Additionally, one can argue
that large fees establish an impermissible property qualification. See U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Qualifications Clause of Article I, section 5 prohibits states
from adding qualifications to those expressed in the Constitution). In Thornton, the Supreme
Court invalidated Arkansas's attempt at imposing term limits on its members of the House
and Senate. The Court observed that property qualifications are also unconstitutional. See id.
at 823-25. Importantly, the Court explained that a state may not indirectly avoid the
limitations of the Qualifications Clause by deeming its restrictions "limitations on ballot
access." Instead, what formally looks like a ballot access requirement might really be an
impermissible qualification. "[A]Ilowing States to evade the Qualifications Clauses by
'dress[ing] eligibility to stand for Congress in ballot access clothing' trivializes the basic
principles of our democracy that underlie those Clauses." Id. at 831. Hence, the Court struck
down Arkansas's attempt to limit its ballots to non-incumbents and incumbents who had
served fewer than the maximum number of terms. I express no opinion on the worth of these
arguments and have not seen them in any reported decisions.
24 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
25 The fee for County Commissioner, for example, was $1424.60. For County Judge,
the fee was $6300. Id. at 135-36.26 Id. at 144.
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run, and second, defraying the costs of administering primaries-were deemed
insufficient to justify the fee. 27 Instead, the Court found that the only
constitutionally acceptable choice was to socialize the costs of primaries. 28
Two years later, in Lubin v. Panish,29 the Court addressed a more modest
California statute that required that House primary candidates pay a fee equal to
1% of the congressional salary, $425 under the prevailing pay schedule. Unlike
Texas, California did not claim that the fee was intended to finance elections;
rather, it claimed that the fee was needed to "keep the ballot from being
overwhelmed with frivolous or otherwise nonserious candidates." 30 The Court
again rejected this argument, concluding that even California's more modest fee
did not satisfy equal protection because it was an inefficient way of screening
out frivolous candidates:
A large filing fee may serve the legitimate function of keeping ballots
manageable but, standing alone, it is not a certain test of whether the candidacy
is serious or spurious. A wealthy candidate with not the remotest chance of
election may secure a place on the ballot by writing a check. Merchants and
other entrepreneurs have been known to run for public office simply to make
their names known to the public. We have also noted that prohibitive filing
fees, such as those in Bullock, can effectively exclude serious candidates ....
Whatever may be the political mood at any given time, our tradition has been
one of hospitality toward all candidates without regard to their economic
status.
31
27 See id. at 147-48. The Court stated:
We. .. reject the theory that since the candidates are availing themselves of the primary
machinery, it is appropriate that they pay that share of the cost that they have
occasioned.... IThe costs do not arise because candidates decide to enter a primary or
because the parties decide to conduct one, but because the State has, as a matter of
legislative choice, directed that party primaries be held.
Id.
2 8 See id. at 148 ("It seems appropriate that a primary system designed to give the voters
some influence at the nominating stage should spread the cost among all of the voters in an
attempt to distribute the influence without regard to wealth.").
29 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
30 Id. at 714.
31 415 U.S. at 717-18. Similar sentiments were expressed in Bullock:
[Elven assuming that every person paying the large fees required by Texas law takes his
own candidacy seriously, that does not make him a "serious candidate" in the popular
sense. If the Texas fee requirement is intended to regulate the ballot by weeding out
12891997]
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Although Bullock and Lubin speak often to equal protection, heightened
scrutiny in both cases was predicated largely on the First Amendment norm of
free political participation. 32 One has a right to associate with others for
political ends, which necessarily includes running for office.33 It is the
fundamental nature of this right, together with correlative rights of voters to
choose their representatives, which causes increased judicial scrutiny. 34
Just as its textual references have been ambiguous, the Court's
constitutional analysis has been somewhat obtuse. The Court has wandered
between strict scrutiny and deference to state legislatures, with little to guide a
speculative student or scholar. Recently, however, the Court reaffirmed
heightened scrutiny's application to political filing fees and signature
spurious candidates, it is extraordinarily ill-fitted to that goal ....
405 U.S. at 146.
32 Contrast, for example, denials of equal access to judicial, as opposed to political, fora.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to apply heightened scrutiny to courthouse filing
fees. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (finding no right to access bankruptcy
court without paying fee); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (finding no right to
challenge reduction in welfare without paying filing fee). Access to the judiciary is not by
itself a fundamental right, and equal protection independently cannot support anything more
than rationality review. Only where an independent fundamental right, such as marriage, see,
e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (establishing right to access divorce court
without paying fee), or child rearing, see, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996)
(finding right to appeal termination of parental rights without paying fees), are at stake will
the Court use more searching scrutiny. Similarly, ballot access generates heightened scrutiny
not because it affects groups in different ways, but because it impinges upon a fundamental
political right.
33 The Court has best analyzed the political applications of the First Amendment in the
context of minor parties and independent candidates attempting to access general election
ballots. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTIMTMONAL LAw 867 (5th ed.
1995). Still, it appears clear that these same principles apply with at least the same force
where primaries are at stake.
34
.See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 567-68 (1996). The Court stated in M.L.B.:
The State's need for revenue to offset costs, in the mine run of cases, satisfies the
rationality requirement; States are not forced by the Constitution to adjust all tolls to
account for "disparity in material circumstances."
But our cases solidly establish two exceptions to that general rule. The basic right to
participate in political processes as voters and candidates cannot be limited to those who
can pay for a license.
Id. (citations omitted).
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requirements. In Tinmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,35 which upheld
Minnesota's anti-fusion law, the Court stated that "severe burdens" on the
electoral process, such as "exclud[ing] a particular group of citizens, or a
political party, from participation in the election process" are subject to strict
scrutiny under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.3 6 "Lesser burdens,"
meanwhile, "trigger less exacting scrutiny, and... important regulatory
interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions. "37 Along these same lines, dicta in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., observed that
"[t]he basic right to participate in political processes as voters and candidates
cannot be limited to those who can pay for a license." 38
Whatever the exact line between "severe" and "lesser" burdens, the
Court's citations to Bullock as a classic example of an impermissible restriction
in both Timmons and M.L.B. indicate that filing fees will continue to receive
staunch scrutiny. At a minimum, they must satisfy the means prong of what is
often referred to as intermediate scrutiny; that is, they must prove truly
necessary to achieve legitimate state interests. 39 Because state interests in
35 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997). An anti-fusion law prevents parties from sharing candidates.
Hence, a candidate endorsed by one party cannot be endorsed by another.36 Id. at 1370.
37 Id. It stated in full:
When deciding whether a state election law violates First and Fourteenth
Amendment associational rights, we weigh the "'character and magnitude'" of the
burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends
justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the
burden necessary. Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs' rights must be
narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however,
trigger less exacting review, and a State's "'important regulatory interests'" will usually
be enough to justify "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.'"
Id. (citations omitted).
38 117 S. Ct. at 568 & n.14 (1996) (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966), Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), and Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709
(1974)). M.L.B. held that indigent parents have the right to appeal the termination of their
parental rights without paying otherwise required fees. See id. at 569-70.
3 9 See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (holding that a court
must "identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the state as justifications for
the burden imposed by its rule"); Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526, 1531-33 (11th Cir. 1992)
(arguing that legitimate and compelling state interests can outweigh some burdens put on the
right to vote); Fulani v. Krivanek, 973 F.2d 1539, 1542-43 (lth Cir. 1992) ("Once a
plaintiff has demonstrated the burden on her fundamental right, the state must show 'that the
law advances a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.'" (quoting
Duke, 954 F.2d at 1529)).
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discouraging frivolous candidates and "winnowing down" the ballot have been
deemed compelling,40 it is this means analysis that limits the number of fees
and signatures states may require.
B. Establishing Constitutional Limits
Two clear points emerge from Bullock and Lubin: a state cannot force
candidates or parties to finance primaries that the state itself requires, 41 and a
state cannot demand filing fees as the sole indicium of a candidate's seriousness.
Fees must be designed to exclude frivolous candidates and alternatives must be
made available to accommodate candidates who cannot afford them.42 An
important question left unanswered by the Court is whether an otherwise
excessive fee fails notwithstanding the existence of an alternative access
4 0 See American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 (1974) ("But we think that
the State's admittedly vital interests are sufficiently implicated to insist that political parties
appearing on the general ballot demonstrate a significant, measurable quantity of community
support.") (footnote omitted). In Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1199
(1996), the Court stated:
Just like a primary, a convention narrows the field of candidates from a potentially
unwieldy number to the serious few who have a realistic chance to win the election. We
have held, in fact, that the State's compelling interest in winnowing down the candidates
justifies substantial restrictions on access to the ballot.
Id.
41 See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 148-49 (1972) (holding that state law that forces
candidates to finance primaries is invalid); Republican Party of Ark. v. Faulkner County, 49
F.3d 1289 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that state law that requires parties to finance primaries is
invalid). In Faulkner County, the Eighth Circuit struck down an Arkansas statute that required
political parties to conduct and find primaries, the result being large filing fees charged by the
two major political parties. Notwithstanding that candidates could alternatively access the
general election ballot by filing as independents and submitting petitions signed by three
percent of qualified voters, see id. at 1295, the Eighth Circuit struck down the funding
requirement as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 1301. Whether
by an outright funding requirement or by an unduly large filing fee, the rule is clear: a state
cannot shift the monetary cost of political primaries to parties and candidates. Primaries
mandated by the state must be financed by the state.
42 See, e.g., Andress v. Reed, 880 F.2d 239, 241-42 (9th Cir. 1989) (sustaining
California's signature alternative which was adopted as a response to Lubin); see also Kevin
Cofsky, Comment, Pruning the Political Thicket: The Case for Strict Scrutiny of State Ballot
Access Restrictions, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 353, 377-78 & n.114 (1996) (alternative to fee is
presumably required).
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mechanism.43 The question is important because many states today assume that
they may charge fees of any size so long as they provide alternatives. 44
States that take this tack must understand two important caveats to Lubin's
prescription for alternative access mechanisms. First, Lubin clearly stated that
alternatives must be reasonable. 45 Even a reasonable fee will not save an
unreasonable signature alternative. Montana's requiring signatures from 5% of
the last election's electorate (over 8500 signatures),46 for example, should
severely test constitutional waters notwithstanding the state's constitutionally
modest filing fee of $1336. 47 Second, alternatives that provide access different
in kind, such as independent access to the general election ballot,48 or the
availability of write-in space on the primary ballot,49 are insufficient.
43 In Andress v. Reed, 880 F.2d 239, 242 (9th Cir. 1989), the court assumed that an
alternative, such as supplying signatures, necessarily saved even an excessive filing fee. The
court never questioned whether the fee was independently reasonable, nor did it find the
alternative unreasonable, even though the alternative required 10,000 signatures.
44 In answers to interrogatories propounded in Green v. Mortham, No. 96-1143-CIV-T-
23A (M.D. Fla. filed June 12, 1996) (challenging Florida's $10,020 fee), for example, the
State of Florida explained: "the existence of a signature petition alternative to a filing fee
precludes an attack on the filing fee." (On file with author).
45 See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) ("[W]e hold that in the absence of
reasonable alternative means of ballot access, a State may not, consistent with constitutional
standards, require from an indigent candidate filing fees he cannot pay.").
46 See MoNT. CODE ANN. § 13-10-203(b) (1995) (requiring signatures from 5% of
voters in last election; totaled 8569 in 1996).
47 See id. § 13-10-202(3) (fee equal to 1% of congressional salary). Similarly,
Oklahoma's requiring signatures from 5% of registered party members, which totaled
between 6853 and 12,440 signatures in 1996, should prove invalid notwithstanding its fee of
only $750. See OKaA. STAT. tit. 26, § 5-112 (1997).
48 See, e.g., Republican Party of Ark. v. Faulkner County, 49 F.3d 1289 (8th Cir.
1995). In Faulkner County, the Eighth Circuit struck down an Arkansas statute that required
political parties to conduct andfind primaries, the result being large filing fees charged by the
two major political parties. Notwithstanding that candidates could alternatively access the
general election ballot by filing as independents and submitting petitions signed by three
percent of qualified voters, see id. at 1295, the Eighth Circuit struck down the funding
requirement as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 1301.
49 Neither Bullock nor Lubin expressly dealt with this issue. In Bullock, Texas law did
not allow write-in votes in primaries. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137 & n.6 (1972).
In Lubin, California law allowed write-ins in primaries, but required that write-in candidates
also pay the fee. See Lubin, 415 U.S. at 711. Hence, Lubin did not involve a true write-in
alternative. Still, the Court in Lubin opined that even a free write-in alternative would be
insufficient as a constitutional matter:
The realities of the electoral process... strongly suggest that "access" via write-in
votes falls far short of access in terms of having the name of the candidate on the
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1. Fees
Symmetry suggests that if signature requirements must be independently
reasonable, then so must fees. The constitutional concern, after all, is not just
access; it is equal access. Large alternative fees grant benefits to affluent
candidates that are not available to all, regardless of the alternative. Granted,
the same can be said of almost any non-nominal fee. But the larger the fee, the
greater the inequity. The farther fees stray from signature alternatives, the
greater the danger that the electoral process will become, and be seen as, an
elite prerogative. In order to assure a semblance of equality, fees and
alternatives should be roughly proportional, at least at the extremes. Just as
signature requirements should not dwarf fees, fees should not stray too far from
what reasonably can be expected of a candidate using an alternative.
This, coupled with constitutional common sense, strongly suggests that
some identifiable limit on fees must exist.50 Sheer volume, such as a $100,000
fee, would lead most to agree on invalidity, regardless of alternatives. 51 Fees
that dwarf or closely approach an office's annual salary should raise most
eyebrows. In Bullock, for example, the Court expressed amazement that several
fees amounted to more than three-quarters of the respective officials' salaries. 52
Dictum in Lubin offers support. While the Court in Lubin53 strongly
implied that certain unreasonable fees-like the 1% charge at issue-might be
saved by reasonable signature alternatives, 54 it was careful to distinguish the
"patently exclusionary" fees55 at issue in Bullock. Three categories of fees
therefore appear to exist: "patently exclusionary" fees; nominal or
ballot.... [A]Ithough we need not decide the issue, the intimation that a write-in
provision without the filing fee... would constitute "an acceptable alternative" appears
dubious at best.
Id. at 719 n.5. But see Lubin, 415 U.S. at 722 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I would regard a
write-in procedure, free of fee, as an acceptable alternative.").
50 See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143 ("[Ihe very size of the fees imposed under the Texas
system gives it a patently exclusionary character.").
51 See, e.g., Dixon v. Maryland State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th
Cir. 1989) (striking down $150 filing fee for local office notwithstanding availability of
complete waiver). Dixon stands for the proposition that an excessive fee cannot be saved by
even a reasonable alternative. Not even a waiver could sustain the fee in Dixon; the waiver
instead demonstrated that the fee was not necessary to any legitimate state interest. See id. at
783-84.
52 Bullock, 405 U.S. at 138 n.10.
53 415 U.S. at 718.
54 See id. at 718-19.
55 See id. at 715 n.4.
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administrative fees; and fees, like those in Lubin, which fall between the
extremes. The first are always invalid, the second valid, and the third invalid
unless coupled with reasonable alternatives.
Recognizing that "patently exclusionary" fees exist leaves open the nagging
problem of drawing judicially manageable lines. Arguments can be made for
several different limits. An argument can even be made that Bullock and Lubin,
coupled with the voting rights case of Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,56
invalidate all fees exceeding administrative costs. 57 Although this argument has
appeal, it appears too late in the day to argue that the Constitution either
prohibits access fees or limits them to administrative costs. Half of the states
today use fees that exceed administrative or nominal costs, 58 and lower courts
56 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Harper held that poll taxes in state elections violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For federal elections, the Twenty-fourth
Amendment previously banned poll taxes in 1962. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. Because
Harper is to voting what Bullock is to ballot access, a credible analogy can be drawn. See
Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1277,
1304 (1993). One might argue, for example, that if excessive fees can be saved by
alternatives, then poll taxes too should be saved by other means of proving voter seriousness.
Take literacy tests, which have passed constitutional scrutiny. See Lassiter v. Northampton
Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959). They are currently illegal under federal election laws, see
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1994), but they are still constitutional. If provided as an alternative,
could they save a poll tax that otherwise violates Harper? Of course, the issue is moot today.
But it would seem that the constitutional answer ought to be no. And if no, it casts a measure
of doubt on the states authority to save excessive ballot fees by providing alternatives.
57 See, e.g., Dixon v. Maryland State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th
Cir. 1989) (striking down as excessive $150 fee for local office).
58 See ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.050(a) (Michie 1996) ($100 filing fee for House); CAL.
ELEc. CODE § 8104(b) (West 1996) (1% of annual salary); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092(1)
(West 1996) (6% of congressional salary); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-131(a)(2) (1993) (3% of
congressional salary); HAw. REv. STAT. § 12-6(b)(1) (1993) ($75 filing fee for House);
IDAHO CODE § 34-605(4) (Supp. 1997) ($300 filing fee for House); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-
206(a) (1993) (1% of annual salary); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118.255(1) (Michie 1993)
($500 filing fee for House); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:464.B(1) & C(1) (West Supp. 1997)
($600 filing fee for House and up to $300 assessment by party); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33,
§ 4A-6(c) (1997) ($100 filing fee); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204B.11(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997)
($300 filing fee); Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-297(b) (1991) ($200 filing fee); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 115.357.1(1) (1997) ($100 filing fee); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-10-202(3) (1993) (1% of
anmal salary); NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-608(2) & (5) (Supp. 1996) (1% of annual salary and
waiver for indigence); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293.193.1 (Michie 1995) ($300 filing fee);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 655:19 & 655:19-c.I(b) (1996) ($5000 filing fee, but only $50 fee
if candidate agrees to campaign spending limits); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-107(a) (1996) (1%
of annual salary); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-06 (1991) (no fee required; qualify by petition
with signatures); OHno REv. CoDEANN. § 3513.10(A) & (B)(1) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997)
($85 filing fee); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 5-112 (1997) ($750 filing fee); OR. REv. STAT.
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have consistently sustained those that have been challenged. 59
One might also argue that the 1% figure to which Lubin alluded divides
salvageable from patently invalid fees. Although I think that 1% of the
congressional salary sounds about right,60 I cannot ascribe this to the holding in
Lubin. The Supreme Court has understandably shied away from selecting
arbitrary limits. Lubin played the cards dealt, which included a 1% fee. That
1% is valid when coupled with an alternative does not necessarily imply that
larger fees are invalid.
Rather than have the Court select an arbitrary figure, a more productive
approach is to borrow consensus figures already in place. The Court's analysis
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments requires that fees prove necessary
to legitimate state interests. Necessity can be assessed by comparing fees of the
several states. 61 Sharp digression from a national convention impeaches
credibility. If every other state gets by with x, why must this state charge
multiples of x, or x plus y? In the absence of a persuasive explanation that the
additional restriction is necessary, it should prove invalid.
Of those states using fees either as the sole method for qualification or as an
alternative method of qualification, well over three-quarters have settled on fees
less than or equal to 1% of the congressional salary62-$1336 under the 1996
§ 249.056(1)(b) (1991) ($100 filing fee); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2873(b)(1) (West 1994)
($150 filing fee); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-40 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) (1% of annual
salary); TEx. ELEc. CODE ANN. § 172.024(a)(3) (West Supp. 1997) ($2500 filing fee); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 20A-9-201(6)(a)(ii) (1995) (1/8 of 1% of salary; waived if indigent); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 24.2-523 & 24.2-521.2 (Michie 1993) (2% of annual salary, plus signatures from 1/
of 1% of voters in district); WASH. REV. CODE § 29.15.050 (1993) (1% of annual salary);
W. VA. CODE § 3-5-8(a) (1994) (1% of annual salary); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-208(a)(ii)
(Michie 1997) ($200 filing fee).
59 See, e.g., Little v. Florida Dep't of State, 19 F.3d 4 (11th Cir. 1994) (sustaining fee
equal to 4 and 1/2% of judicial salary); Andress v. Reed, 880 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1989)
(sustaining fee equal to 1% of congressional salary); Adams v. Askew, 511 F.2d 700 (5th
Cir. 1975) (sustaining fee of 5% of official's salary). But see Dixon v. Maryland State
Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989) (striking down $150 fee for local
office).60 See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Rockefeller v. Powers, 917 F. Supp. 155, 160 (E.D.N.Y.), af'd, 78 F.3d
44 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that other states' practices indicate that New York's election
regulations were not necessary).
62 See ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.050(a) (Michie 1996) ($100 filing fee for House); CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 8104(b) (West 1996) (1% of annual salary); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15,
§ 3103(b) (1993) (party sets fee not to exceed 1% of annual salary); HAw. REv. STAT. § 12-
6(b)(1) (1993) ($75 filing fee for House); IDAHO CODE § 34-605(4) (Supp. 1997) ($300 filing
fee for House); Indiana (no fee); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-206(a) (1993) (1% of annual salary);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118.255(1) (Michie 1993) ($500 filing fee for House); LA. REV.
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pay schedule. 63 Roughly half charge $500 or less.64 Only five states, 65 Florida,
STAT. ANN. § 18:464.B(l) & C(1) (West Supp. 1997) ($600 filing fee for House and up to
$300 assessment by party); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 4A-6(c) (1997) ($100 filing fee);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 204B.11(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997) ($300 filing fee); Mm. CODE ANN.
§ 23-15-297(b) (1991) ($200 filing fee); Mo. REv. STAT. § 115.357.1(1) (1997) ($100 filing
fee); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 13-10-202(3) (1993) (1% of annual salary); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 32-608(2) & (5) (Supp. 1996) (1% of annual salary and waiver for indigence); NEv. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 293.193.1 (Michie 1995) ($300 filing fee); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-107(a)
(1996) (1% of annual salary); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-06 (1991) (no fee required;
qualify by petition with signatures); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3513.10(A) & (B)(1) (Banks-
Baldwin Supp. 1997) ($85 filing fee); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 5-112 (1997) ($750 filing fee);
OR. REv. STAT. § 249.056(1)(b) (1991) ($100 filing fee); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-40 (Law
Co-op. Supp. 1996) (1% of annual salary); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-201(6)(a)(ii) (1995)
(1/8 of 1% of salary; waived if indigent); WASH. REV. CODE § 29.15.050 (1993) (1% of
annual salary); W. VA. CODE § 3-5-8(a) (1994) (1% of annual salary); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-5-208(a)(ii) (Miehie 1997) ($200 filing fee); cf. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 655:19 &
655:19-c. I(b) (1996) ($5000 filing fee, but reduced to $50 fee if candidate agrees to campaign
spending limits).
63 On October 10, 1997, President Clinton signed Public Law 105-55, the Legislative
Branch Appropriations Act of 1998, which effectively granted to both House and Senate
members a cost of living adjustment ("COLA") amounting to 2.3 % of their annual salary.
See Pay Raise for Congress Tucked into Spending Bill, RALEIGH NEWs & OBSEpvER, Oct.
12, 1997, at A8. With this adjustment, the current salary for House members totals $136,672.
Id. Because this COLA was built into the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194,
§ 704, 103 Stat. 1716, 1769, it required no congressional action in 1997. Instead, because
Congress failed to expressly suspend the COLA (as it had done since 1993), the 1998
adjustment was automatic. See generalty Boehner v. Anderson, 809 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C.
1992), aft'd, 30 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing mechanics of COLA and deciding that
it did not violate terms of the Twenty-seventh Amendment). Those states that express ballot
access fees as a percentage of the House salary will therefore experience a proportionate
increase.
64 See AIASKA STAT. § 15.25.050(a) (Michie 1996) ($100); bAHO CODE § 34-605(4)
(Supp. 1997) ($300); MN. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 4A-6(c) (1997) ($100); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 204B.11(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997) ($300); Mss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-297(b) (1991) ($200);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 115.357.1(1) (1997) ($100); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293.193.1 (Michie
1995) ($300); OR. REV. STAT. § 249.056(1)(b) (1991) ($100); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-
201(6)(a)(ii) (1995) (1/8 of 1% of congressional salary); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-208(a)(ii)
(Michie 1997) ($200). Three states requiring both fees and signatures also require $500 or
less. See HAw. REv. STAT. § 12-6(b)(1) (1993) ($75); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118.255(1)
(Michie 1993) ($500); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3513.10(A) & (1)(1) (Banks-Baldwin Supp.
1997) ($85); cf. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 655:19 & 655:19-c.I(b) (1996) ($5000 filing fee,
but only $50 if candidate agrees to spending limits).
65 Two others, Arkansas and Alabama, authorize parties to charge more than this
amount, but do not require any fee whatsoever. See ALA. CODE § 17-16-15 (1995) (parties
may assess fees not to exceed 2% of salary); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-301 (Michie 1993)
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Texas, Georgia, Virginia 66 and New Hampshire, 67 require more than 1%.
Given that a clear consensus favors a maximum of 1% of the congressional
salary, fees exceeding this amount ought to be seriously questioned. Chances
are they are designed not to "winnow ballots," but are impermissibly focused
on financing elections and raising revenue.
Florida is illustrative. Florida charged a $10,020 fee for access to its 1996
House primaries. 68 Clearly, this fee cannot credibly be claimed to offset the
cost of placing candidates' names on primary ballots. The question, then, is
why charge so much? The answer, in large part, lies in raising revenue to
support various electoral projects, as well as the two major political parties. 69 In
1996, each $10,020 fee was divided like this: $1336 was deposited in an
"Election Commission Trust Fund," 70 $2004 was deposited in an "Election
Campaign Financing Trust Fund,"'71 $3228.20 was placed in general
(parties set their own fees; $3500 for Republicans and $5000 for Democrats in 1996). In the
absence of state laws requiring that parties hold and finance primaries, see, e.g., Republican
Party of Ark. v. Faulkner County, 49 F.3d 1289 (8th Cir. 1995) (striking down Arkansas's
funding scheme that allowed parties to set fees but required that they hold and fund
primaries), allowing parties discretion to set fees would appear to present less serious
constitutional problems. But see Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that party
primaries are subject to constitutional constraints because they involve a traditional state
function).
66 Virginia requires 2% of the congressional salary if a primary is held, but allows
parties to use conventions instead. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-523 & 24.2-521.2 (Michie
1993) (primary access requires 2% of annual salary plus signatures from 1/ of 1% of voters
in district); id. § 24.2-509(A) (parties may choose conventions). Major parties therefore often
use conventions rather than primaries. Because of this, primary data from Virginia is sparse,
see, e.g., 1996 ELECnONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 162, which has led me to exclude
Virginia from the tables and computations conducted below. See infra notes 125-63 and
accompanying text.
67 New Hampshire charges $5000, but reduces the fee to $50 if the candidate agrees to
campaign spending limits. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 655:19 & 655:19-c.I(b) (1996).
68 Florida reduced its fee for congressional primaries from 7 and 1/2% to 6% of the
congressional salary in 1997. See 1997 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 97-13, § 11 (West)
(amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092(1) (West 1996)) (effective Jan. 1, 1998). The fee was
accordingly reduced from $10,020 to $8016.
69 Challenges to the disbursement of fee receipts have been uniformly rejected in
Florida. See Boudreau v. Winchester, 642 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); McNamee v.
Smith, 647 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). But see Butterworth v. Republican Party,
604 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1992) (indicating possible merit in challenge to disbursements).
70 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092(1) (West 1996) ("election assessment" of 1% of
congressional salary goes to Election Commission Trust Fund).
71 See id. § 99.092(1) (assessment of 1 and 1/2% of congressional salary goes to
Election Campaign Financing Trust Fund).
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revenue, 72 and the remaining $3406.80 was given to the candidate's party.73
Although balances have varied, the Election Campaign Financing Trust Fund
maintained a balance of over $2,000,000 in 1996.74 The Election Commission
Trust Fund held almost $900,000 in 1993.75
2. Signatures
Florida, of course, argues that its fee is motivated more by frivolous
candidacies than raising revenue. 76 Any revenue generated by the fees is
secondary, a bonus if you will. The money paid to the parties is not to placate
them; it is merely a way of purchasing compliance with the state's regulation of
the party's internal affairs. It may look to be at the expense of the candidate,
but, after all, candidates do not have to pay the fee. They can use the signature
alternative instead. It is all a matter of choice.
The problem with this rejoinder is that Florida has set its signature
alternative high enough that few candidates can use it. Florida's alternative
requires signatures from 3 percent of the total number of registered party voters
in the candidate's district, a figure that averages almost four thousand
signatures. 77 In 1992, 1994 and 1996, only one in four candidates in Florida
qualified under this alternative. 78 From 1978 through the 1988 election,
72 See id. (2% of congressional salary is party assessment); id. § 99.103 (15% of
remainder of 3 % of congressional salary is deposited in general revenue).
73 See id. § 99.103 (3% of congressional salary, less 15% of this figure, is given to
party executive committee).
74 Telephone Interview with Anne Serenti, Florida Department of State) (Apr. 23,
1997). The Fund was abolished in 1997 when the filing fee was reduced to 6% of the
congressional salary. See supra note 68.
75 Telephone Interview with Anne Serenti, id.
76 Consider, however, Florida's explanation in Green v. Mortham, No. 96-1143-CIV-T-
23A (M.D. Fla. filed June 12, 1996) (on file with author), that "a filing fee is an acceptable
method of, among other things, assuring ballot integrity and defraying election-related costs,"
as well as its statutory finding that using filing fees to "public[ly] fund[ ] ... political
campaigns" does not infringe candidates' rights because of "a viable alternative to paying the
filing fees." 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 91-107.
77 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.095(3) (West 1996) (requiring signatures from 3% of
registered party members in district). The raw number of signatures varies depending on the
party and the district. In 1996, the number of signatures varied between 1821 and 6894 for
Democrats, and 799 and 5853 for Republicans. The mean number for all primaries in 1996
was 3908. (Data on file with author).
78 In 1992, 1994 and 1996, 204 Republican and Democratic candidates ran in Florida's
congressional primaries. See Affidavit of David A. Rancourt, Director, Division of Elections,
Florida Department of State (Aug. 16, 1996) (filed in Green v. Morthan, No. 96-1143-CIV-
T-23A (M.D. Fla. filed June 12, 1996)) (on file with author). One-hundred-forty-eight of
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moreover, when Florida's filing fee was 5% of the congressional salary, not
one candidate for either the Republican or Democratic congressional primaries
qualified by using the signature alternative. 79 Almost 300 candidates qualified
by paying the fee. 80 This did not change in 1990 when the fee was raised to 6%
of the House salary, $5370 based on the prevailing congressional pay scale. 81
As in the previous six elections, the 45 candidates who qualified for Florida's
congressional primaries in 1990 all paid the filing fee. 82 Only after the filing fee
was raised to 7 and 1/2%, $9382.50, for the 1992 election83 did candidates
begin using the signature alternative. And then in 1997, perhaps because too
many candidates turned to the signature alternative, Florida returned its fee to
6% of the congressional salary. 84
Georgia's experience is similar. Georgia in 1996 required, on average, just
over 2500 signatures. 85 Not one candidate qualified using this alternative in the
1996 Georgia primaries; all thirty-two candidates paid the $4008 fee. 86 Even
Texas, which is unique among signature alternative states because it has set its
signature requirement at a level well below its fee (500 signatures versus a
$2500 fee), only eight of 112 candidates in 1996 used the alternative. 87
these candidates, almost 75 %, paid the fee rather than collect signatures. See id.
79 See id.
80 See Memorandum from Connie A. Evans, Division of Elections, Florida Department
of State, to George Waas, Florida Assistant Attorney General (Aug. 20, 1996) (filed in Green
v. Mortham, No. 96-1143-CIV-T-23A (M.D. Fla. filed June 12, 1996)) (on file with author).
81 The fee increase to 6% became effective on January 1, 1990. See 1989 Fla. Laws ch.
89-338, § 8 (effective Jan. 1, 1990). The House salary on July 1, 1989 was $89,500. See
Exec. Order No. 12,663 (Schedule 6) (effective Jan. 6, 1989), 3 C.F.R. 199 (1990),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 5332 (1988). Florida relies on the congressional salary extant on July
1 of the year preceding the primary. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092(1) (West 1996).
82 See supra note 78.
83 The fee was increased to 7 and 1/2% on July 1, 1991. See 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 91-
107, § 1 (effective July 1, 1991). The House salary also had jumped by this time to $125,100.
See Exec. Order No. 12,736 (Schedule 6) (effective Jan. 1, 1991), 3 C.F.R. 316 (1991),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 5332 (Supp. II 1990). These changes combined to push Florida's
filing fee to $9382.50.
84 See supra note 68.
85 See Letter from H. Jeff Lanier, Director, Georgia State Elections Division, to Mark
R. Brown (July 23, 1996) (filed in Green v. Mortham, No. 96-1143-CIV-T-23A (M.D. Fla.
filed June 12, 1996)) (on file with author).
86 See id. ("I received your recent letter requesting the number of signatures that a
pauper would need to file for ballot access in each of Georgia's congressional districts. We
have not calculated that figure for all of the districts since it was not required by any
candidate.-).
87 Telephone Interviews with Michael Jordan, Texas Republican Party, and Helen
Moore, Texas Democratic Party (May 27, 1997).
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One might argue that the relative affluence of candidates in states like
Texas, Florida and Georgia makes it easier for them to pay their respective fees
than collect signatures. "Serious" candidates obviously have money and find it
easier to pay fees. That no one uses an alternative does not prove that it is
unreasonable. It only shows that candidates choose not to use it. In some states,
moreover, like Georgia s8 and Florida (prior to 1992),89 signature alternatives
are limited to those candidates who cannot afford the fee. Hence, serious
candidates with money, those who likely could collect the requisite number of
signatures, cannot use it. It is not surprising, the argument goes, that no one in
Georgia in 1996 and no one in Florida prior to 1992 used the alternative.
Two responses are in order. First, signature drives present an expedient
way to reach voters. All else being equal, a signature alternative ought to be the
preferred choice; it is cheap advertising. Second, it is doubtful that money is no
object to all serious candidates. True, many incumbents and ardent challengers
spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on their campaigns. 90 Fees for them are
a mere pittance. Many candidates, however, would gladly use a signature
alternative if it saved thousands of dollars in fees. Their failure to do so in
states, like Texas, that do not require indigency in order to make use of
signature alternatives evinces the relative difficulty of collecting hundreds of
signatures. Florida, moreover, repealed its indigency requirement for the 1992
election. Eighty candidates registered to qualify by collecting signatures that
year,91 but only nineteen successfully collected the requisite number of
88 Georgia requires that a candidate using the signature alternative "shall under oath
affirn his or her poverty and his or her resulting inability to pay the qualifying fee otherwise
required." GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-132(t) (1993). Some states, like Delaware, require more
than a mere inability to pay the fee. Delaware goes so far as to require that the prospective
"indigent" candidate be "receiving benefits under the Supplemental Security Income Program
for Aged, Blind and Disabled under Subehapter XVI of Chapter 7 of Title 42 of the United
States Code," or meet the "resources tests for such benefits under 42 U.S.C § 1382(a), as
applied to Delaware residents." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3103(e) (Supp. 1996).
89 Prior to the 1992 elections, Florida required that a candidate using the signature
alternative "file an oath... stating that he is unable to pay the qualifying fee... without
imposing an undue burden on his personal resources or on resources otherwise available to
him." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.095(1) (West 1990). This requirement was eliminated after the
1990 election. See 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-315 (redacting oath requirement).
90 See Rasldn & Bonifaz, supra note 1, at 1174-75 ("A winning campaign for the U.S.
House of Representatives in 1992 cost, on average, $543,000, and the average rose to
$730,000 in what can be deemed close races. Forty-three House candidates each spent more
than $1 million on his or her campaign in 1992.").
91 See DIVISION OF ELEcnoNs, FLORIDA DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT ON 1992 PETITION
CANDIDATES (filed in Green v. Mortham, No. 96-1143-CIV-T-23A (M.D. Fla. filed June 12,
1996)) [hereinafter REPORT ON 1992 PETION CANDIDATES] (on file with author). In order to
1997] 1301
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
signatures. 92 Measured against Florida's total number of primary candidates in
1992, 1994 and 1996, moreover, only 27% qualified using the alternative. 93
This is surprising when one considers that Florida's fee from 1992 through
1996 ranged between $9000 and $10,000.
The lesson is that collecting hundreds or thousands of signatures, usually in
a short period of time94 and under tedious restrictions, 95 is a difficult chore,
even for experienced candidates. Large signature alternatives force candidates
to choose fees, regardless of the dollar amount. Where a vast majority of
candidates elect to pay thousands of dollars in fees rather than collect
signatures, the reasonableness of the alternative must be questioned. It is
disingenuous to argue that an unused, unrealistic and unreasonable alternative
somehow saves an excessive fee. 96 Statements like that found in Andress v.
use the signature alternative in Florida, one must first register with the proper election
authorities. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.095 (West 1996). That statute states:
A person using this petitioning process shall file an oath with the officer before whom
the candidate would qualify for the office stating that he or she intends to qualify by this
alternative method for the office sought .... No signatures shall be obtained by a
candidate on any nominating petition until the candidate has filed the oath required in this
section.
It is for this reason that data from Florida is even available. Texas, for example, does not
gather information on candidates who unsuccessfully make use of the signature alternative.
See Telephone Interview with Michael Jordan, supra note 87.92 See REPORT ON 1992 PETION CANDIDATES, supra note 91.
93 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
94 In Florida, as is true in most states, signatures must be collected over the course of a
specified period of time, usually three or four months, immediately preceding the primary.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.095(1) (West 1996) (stating that signatures may be collected
following "the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January of the year in which the first
primary is held" and "prior to the 21st day preceding the first day of the qualifying period for
the office sought"); id. § 99.061(1) (qualifying period described in § 99.095(1) begins "the
120th day prior to the first primary"). In 1996, for example, Florida's deadline for filing
signatures was April 15.
95 In Texas, for instance, the statutory rules regulating signature collection specify in
detail what the collector must say to the prospective signatory. See TEx. ELEc. CODE ANN.
§ 141.064 (West 1986). Texas also limits a signatory to endorsing only one candidate. See id.
§ 141.066.
96 The Supreme Court speculated in Lubin that states could constitutionally require a
"substantial" number of signatures. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718-19 (1974). In
the few cases where the Court has considered the validity of signature requirements, it has
routinely sustained numbers that reach into the thousands. In Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S.
431 (1971), among others, the Court upheld a Georgia law which required signatures from
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Reed, where in the context of Senatorial ballot access the court opined that
"certainly the requirement that [the prospective candidate] collect 10,000
signatures within approximately forty-five days is reasonable and
constitutionally adequate," 97 are remarkable for how far they stray from reality.
Even in those states that require fewer signatures and have smaller fees, the
raw number of signatures required is uniformly set at98 or well above 99 the raw
five percent of the electorate in order to gain access to the general election ballot. Jenness,
however, is not controlling. The Jenness line of cases dealt with the permissible number of
signatures for minor parties' and independent candidates' access to general election ballots.
The Supreme Court sustained the five percent requirement in Jenness because it found that
requiring signatures leveled the playing field between major party candidates, who were
forced into primaries, and independents and minor party candidates, who were not. The Court
surmised that because winning a primary is at least as difficult as obtaining signatures from
five percent of the electorate, everyone was treated roughly the same. See id. at 440-41; see
also Libertarian Party of Fla. v. Florida, 710 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1983) (sustaining
requirement that party obtain signatures from three percent of the electorate in order to qualify
for general election ballot). Because primaries are screening mechanisms for general
elections, gaining access to the former should not require the same modicum of support as
does participating in the latter. Primary candidates, moreover, cannot be expected to have the
resources of a minor party. Courts should therefore be hesitant to rely on cases like Jenness to
support signature requirements for primaries. Although signatures may be constitutionally
required for primaries, their permissible scope has yet to be determined. All agree that
signature alternatives can be burdensome. See Rockefeller v. Powers, 917 F. Supp. 155, 159
(E.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 78 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1996) ("While Lubin dealt with ballot access that was
impermissibly burdened by filing fees, it is clear that signature and other requirements may
likewise impermissibly burden voter choice.").
97 880 F.2d 239, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Andress erred by comparing signature
requirements for primaries, which apply to candidates, to signature requirements for general
elections, which apply to parties. Large signature requirements for the latter have been
sustained by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). Parties,
of course, have more resources than a lone candidate. Moreover, the state's interest in
limiting the general election ballot is greater than limiting primaries. If nothing else, the state
has an interest in requiring that a minor party candidate, or even an independent candidate,
overcome roughly the same hurdles as a major party candidate who has survived a political
primary.
98 Only one state, Washington, sets the numbers at the same level. See WAsH. REv.
CODE § 29.15.050 (1993) ($1336 fee versus 1336 signatures).
99 Of the eighteen states that use both fees and signature altematives, thirteen set the raw
number of signatures at a level above the raw dollar figure of the fee. See CAL. ELEc. CODE
§§ 8106(2) & 8106(a)(2) (West Supp. 1996) ($1336 fee versus 3000 signatures); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 3103(b) & 3103(d) (Supp. 1996) (party sets fee not to exceed $1336 versus
3828 signatures in 1996); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 12-6(b)(1) & 12-6(e) (1993) ($75 filing fee
for House plus 25 signatures versus alternative of between 1191 and 1253 signatures in 1996);
IDAHO CODE §§ 34-605(3) & (4) (Supp. 1997) ($300 fee versus 500 signatures); KAN. STAT.
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dollar figure of the fee. Given the commercial cost of collecting signatures,
which commonly varies between $0.85 and $2.00 per signature, 100 fees have
understandably proven to be the more efficient method of gaining ballot access.
This does not mean that signatures cannot provide a viable ballot access
mechanism. The keys are reasonableness and symmetry, setting the number at
a realistic level that does not stray too far from the fee. Remember that a
substantial number of states forego fees altogether in favor of signatures,10'
ANN. §§ 25-205(e)(2) & 25-206(a) (1993) ($1336 fee versus between 1707 and 1995
signatures in 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:464.B(1) & C, & 18:465.C(3)(b) (West
Supp. 1997) ($900 total fee versus 1000 signatures); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 204B.11(1)(a) &
204B.11(2)(b) (West Supp. 1997) ($300 fee versus 1000 signatures); Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 115.357.1(1) & 115.357.3 (1997) ($100 fee versus between 1530 and 2303 signatures in
1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-10-202(3) & 13-10-203(2)(b) (Supp. 1995) ($1336 fee
versus 8569 signatures in 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-107(a) & 163-107-1(c) (1995)
($1336 fee versus signatures from 10% of registered party members); Oino REv. CODE ANN.
3513.10(A) & (B) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997) ($85 filing fee); OxiA. STAT. tit. 26, § 5-112
(1997) ($750 fee versus between 6853 and 12,440 signatures in 1996); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 249.056(1)(b) (Supp. 1996) ($100 fee versus 1000 signatures); W. VA. CODE § 3-5-8(a)
(1994) ($1336 fee versus 5344 signatures). Only Texas, Florida, Georgia and New
Hampshire set signature numbers below dollar figures, which given the high fees is
understandable. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 99.092(1) & 99.095(1) (West Supp. 1997) ($10,020
fee versus between 3000 and 5000 signatures in 1996); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-131(a)(2) &
21-132(g) (1981) ($4008 fee versus between 2661 and 2780 signatures in 1996); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 655:19 & 655:19-c.I1 (1996) ($5000 fee versus 1000 signatures); TEx. ELEC.
CODE ANN. §§ 172.024(a)(3) & 172.025(2)(B) (West Supp. 1997) ($2500 fee versus 500
signatures). Washington's signatures and fees are the same. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 29.15.050 (1993) ($1336 fee versus 1336 signatures).
100 See Affidavit of Richard Arnold, CEO of National Voter Outreach, a for-profit
corporation that solicits signatures for political campaigns (Sept. 9, 1996) (filed in Green v.
Mortham, No. 96-1143-CIV-T-23A (M.D. Fla. filed June 12, 1996) ("The normal charge for
soliciting signatures for political campaigns is between $0.85 and $2.00 per signature.").
101 See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-322.A.2 (West 1996) (qualify by collecting
signatures from 1/2 of 1% of registered party members residing in district); CoLO. REv.
STAT. § 1-4-801(2)(b) (1997) (must file 1000 signatures); 10 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/7-10b
(West Supp. 1997) (must file by submitting signatures from 1 of 1% of party members in
district); IOwA CODE § 43.20.3 (1991) (must file signatures from 2% of voters from party
who participated in last general election and not less than 1% of total vote of candidate's party
in district in last election); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 335.5.C (West 1993) (must file
1000 signatures from voters in district); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 53, § 6 (Law. Co-op. 1990 &
Supp. 1997) (must submit 2000 signatures from voters); McH. CoMP. LAws § 168.133
(Supp. 1997) (must submit signatures from 1% of party voters for secretary of state in district
in last election); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:23-8 (West 1989) (must file 200 signatures from party
members in district who voted in last election); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-33 (Michie 1995) (in
order to access pre-primary must submit signatures from 2% of party voters in district in last
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which proves that signature requirements work. Unlike states which use
signatures as the alternative, 10 2 furthermore, pure signature states tend to
require substantially fewer signatures. Most states require 1000 or less. 10 3
Many states require 500 or less. 104 All but one state require less than 1500
gubernatorial election); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-136.2(g) (McKinney Supp. 1997) (must submit
1250 signatures from party members in district); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-06 (1981)
(must submit 300 signatures from qualified electors or otherwise obtain party endorsement);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 17-14-7(b) (1996) (must file 500 signatures from voters); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 12-6-7 (Michie 1995) (must file signatures from 1% of party voters who participated
in last gubernatorial election in district); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-5-101(b)(1) (Supp. 1996)
(must submit 25 voter signatures); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2355(1) (1982) (must submit
500 signatures from voters in district); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8.15(6)(b) (West 1996) (must
submit 1000 signatures from voters within district).
102 Several states in addition to Florida and Georgia require thousands of signatures in
order to obtain alternative access to the ballot. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8106(a)(2) (West
Supp. 1996) (3000 signatures, though receive pro rata discount on fee for portion of
signatures collected); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3103(d) (Supp. 1996) (signatures from 1%
of registered voters; totaled 3828 for 1996 primary); HAw. REv. STAT. § 12-6(e) (1993) ('A
of 1% of registered voters; totaled between 1191 and 1253 for 1996 primary, depending on
district); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-206(3)(2) (1993) (signatures from 2% of registered party
members in district; totaled between 1707 and 1995 for 1996 primary, depending on district);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.357.3 (West 1997) (signatures from 1% of voters in last election;
totaled between 1530 and 2303 for 1996 primary); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-10-203(2)(b)
(Supp. 1995) (signatures from 5% of voters for winner in last general election; totaled 8569
for 1996 primary); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163.107.1(c) (1995) (signatures from 10% of
registered party members in district); WASH. REv. CODE § 29.15.050 (1993) (signatures from
1336 voters); W. VA. CODE § 3-5-8(a) (1994) (signatures from 5344 voters).
10 3 See Amz. RnV. STAT. ANN. § 16-322.A.2 (West 1996) (signatures from 1/2 of 1% of
registered party members in district; totaled between 619 and 867 for 1996 primary,
depending on district); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-801(2)(b) (1997) (signatures from 1000
voters); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-10b (West Supp. 1997) (signatures from / of 1% of
qualified party members in district; totaled between 476 and 1098 for 1996 primary,
depending on district); IOWA CODE § 43.20.3 (1991) (signatures from 2% of voters in last
general election in each of at least half of counties in district and not less than 1% of total vote
of party in last election; totaled between 827 and 905 for 1996 primary, depending on
district); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 335.5.C (West 1993) (signatures from 1000
voters); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:23-8 (West 1989) (signatures from 200 registered party
members); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-06 (1981) (signatures from 300 voters); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25, § 2872.1 (West 1994) (signatures from 1000 party members plus $150 filing
fee); R.I. GmN. LAWS § 17-14-7(b) (Michie 1996) (signatures from 500 voters); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 2-5-101(b)(1) (Supp. 1996) (signatures from 25 voters); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 2355(1) (1982) (signatures from 500 voters in district); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8.15(6)(b)
(West 1996) (signatures from 1000 voters).
104 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:23-8 (West 1989) (signatures from 200 registered party
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signatures.' 05 The lone exception is Massachusetts, which requires 2000
signatures. 106
Using these states as a guide, 1000 signatures appears to present a safe
outer constitutional limit. A consensus of states have found this figure
manageable, and it bears a striking symmetry to the consensus fee of $1336.
Although experience teaches that most candidates would still pay the fee, the
difficulty of raising this number of signatures appears roughly proportional to
paying a $1336 fee. As a constitutional matter then, fees that exceed $1336
should be subjected to fairly serious constitutional scrutiny. Alternatives that
exceed 1000 signatures should also be viewed suspiciously. In the absence of
persuasive justifications, requirements beyond these extremes should be
invalidated under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
II. LOOKiNG BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION: A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
Three overt justifications support ballot access requirements.' 0 7 First and
members); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-06 (1981) (signatures from 300 voters); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 17-14-7(b) (1996) (signatures from 500 voters); ThNN. CODE ANN. § 2-5-101(b)(1)
(Supp. 1996) (signatures from 25 voters); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2355(1) (1982)
(signatures from 500 voters in district).
105 See MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 168.133 (Supp. 1997) (signatures from 1% of party
voters in district for secretary of state in last election; totaled roughly 1200 for 1996 primary);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-33.B (Michie 1995) (signatures from 2% of party voters in district
for governor in last election; totaled between 1000 and 1500 for 1996 pre-primary); N.Y.
ELEC. LAW § 6-136.2(g) (McKinney Supp. 1997) (signatures from 1250 party members);
S.D. CODFID LAws § 12-6-7 (Michie 1995) (signatures from 1% of party voters in last
gubernatorial election in district; totaled between 1263 and 1726 for 1996 primary depending
on party).
106 See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 53, § 6 (Law Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1997) (signatures
from 2000 voters). New Mexico requires a number of signatures equal to 2% of the party's
voters in the district in the last gubernatorial election, which in 1996 totaled between 1000 and
1500 signatures, in order to gain access to the pre-primary ballot. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text. Twice as many signatures are required of candidates who do not achieve
significant support at the party's pre-primary convention, meaning that the number of
signatures required could reach 3000. Still, because candidates can access the pre-primary
ballot with less than 1500 signatures, and then can access the primary ballot with no additional
signatures, New Mexico is accurately described, I think, as requiring no more than 1500
signatures.
107 1 am focusing on requirements beyond those imposed by Article I. See U.S. CoNsr.
art. I, §§ 2 & 3. Article I's requirements are geared toward insuring maturity and community:
one must be a certain age and live in a particular place for an established period of time. See
id.
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foremost, ballot access requirements filter out "frivolous" candidacies. 108
Second, they provide stability to the ballot and to the American political system.
Without restrictions, the argument goes, primaries would turn into political
free-for-alls and voters could not make sensible selections. 109 Lastly, fees fund
elections." 0 Who better than candidates should pay for the electoral process?
A more subtle argument, and one not often freely conceded, is that ballot
access limitations perpetuate incumbency. Of course, incumbency today is a
controversial topic. Several states have recently passed term limit measures,
both on the congressional"' and local levels.112 Although the former have
proved unconstitutional, 113 their passage proves a general, gnawing suspicion
that incumbents are not able to govern in their constituents' best interests.' 14
108 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 1372 (1997)
("States certainly have an interest in protecting the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of their
ballots and election processes as means for electing public officials."); Lubin v. Panish, 415
U.S. 709, 717 (1974) (stating that "[a] large filing fee may serve the legitimate function of
keeping ballots manageable"); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (holding that a
state may prohibit "frivolous or fraudulent candidacies").
109 See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 732 (1974) (holding that the state has an
interest in avoiding voter confusion, preventing an overly burdened political process, and
insuring that winners receive a majority of the votes).
110 See, e.g., Bullock, 405 U.S. at 856 (state argues that fees "provide a means for
financing such elections").
111 Prior to U.S. Tenn Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), twenty-two states
passed congressional term limits. See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 846.
112 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-10-201 (1995) (term limits for state legislators).
113 See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). Term limits for state and
local offices should present no momentous federal constitutional concerns. See, e.g., League
of Women Voters of Me. v. Diamond, 82 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of
preliminary injunction barring enforcement of state term limit law).
114 See, e.g., GEORGE F. WILL, REsToRATION: CONGREsS, TERM IM AND THE
RECOVERY OF DEUBERATIE DEiOCRACY 182 (1992) ("The unhealthy tendency that today
requires constitutional correction is the distortion of government and the demotion of
Congress in the regime. That distortion and that demotion have been produced by legislative
careerism predicated on constant abuse of the power of the purse."). But see Nelson W.
Polsby, Restoration Comedy, 102 YALE L.J. 1515, 1523 (1993) (reviewing WnIL)
("[E]ntrance to and exit from Congress are two points at which members are especially
vulnerable to interest group influence; therefore, the more entering and exiting, the more
outside influence. Term limits are intended to promote more entering and exiting, and
therefore, if this analysis is correct, would worsen the very conditions of which Will
complains."). See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-
Legislator, 81 CORNaL L. REv. 623, 630 (1996) ("Term limits activists hope to rid
Congress of the politician because they believe that such a lawmaker inevitably acts in ways
that are contrary to the public interest.").
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Still, one must concede that some level of incumbency is desirable, if for no
other reason than it provides a measure of stability to government. 115 Few
serious political scientists would argue that constant and complete turnover
ought to occur in a collective governing body. 116 Placing procedural hurdles in
the path of potential candidates appears to be a logical way to protect
incumbents.
On the other side, three basic values counsel against ballot restrictions.
First, self-realization and self-determination are premised on individual and
communal participation in the political process. Although widely expressed in
terms of the individual's right to speak 17 and vote, 118 self-realization must also
be understood to include running for office. How better to advance one's self-
interest than to gain direct participation in government? Running for office,
then, is quintessential political speech. The political community, meanwhile,
has a right to self-determination, which necessarily must include, at some level,
choices among candidates.1 19 The community might choose an incumbent, or it
might prefer a challenger. But electoral choice is certainly a valuable
commodity.
A second, related value lies in the competitive political market. Political
competition promotes truth in the ideal sense and fosters true representative
government. Representatives are responsive, in large part, because of future
elections. 120  Political competition, or at least its threat, encourages
accountability in our republican system. Even unsuccessful competition is
115 Incumbency also promotes expertise. See Polsby, supra note 114, at 1523 ("It should
come as no surprise at all that experience on the job helps liberals and conservatives alike do
their jobs better.").
116 If it were otherwise, Representatives would be restricted to a single term. No state
passed such a restrictive term limit. Most allowed six terms. See Garrett, supra note 114, at
697 n.11. That not all Senators are up for re-election at the same time, moreover,
demonstrates the Framers found some level of continuity important. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I,
§ 3 (providing for three classes of Senators, a class being vacated every two years).
117 See, e.g., MAnT H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPREsSION: A CR1ICAL ANALYsIs 4-
5 (1984) ("[A]ll forms of purely communicative activity serve the same ultimate value-what
I label 'self-realization.'"); THOMAs I. EMERSON, THm SYSTEM oF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
6 (1970) (speech advances "individual self-fulfillment").
118 See, e.g., ALExANDERMEoHN, POLmcAL FREEDoM 55 (1960).
119 See, e.g., Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1198 (1996) ("Rules
concerning candidacy requirements and qualifications, we have held, [have the) potential to
'undermine the effectiveness of voters who wish to elect particular candidates.'") (quoting
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 570 (1969)).
120 See, e.g., Polsby, supra note 114, at 1523 ("The argument I am pressing simply
says that the newer the member, the more dependent he or she is on the interest groups that
helped elect him or her in the first place.").
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important because it aborts complacency and fosters better government.
Challengers, therefore, should be encouraged both to provide greater choice
and for competition's own sake.
Finally, ballot restrictions, especially monetary ones, impact people and
groups in different ways. 121 Fairness demands that all citizens have an equal
opportunity to participate in communal decisions. To the extent that ballot
access restrictions allow some, but not others, to run for office, they may cause
debilitating inequities. 122 The American commitment to equality and the
democratic ideal counsel against class-based barriers to participation in
government. 123
It is impossible to perfectly accommodate all of these values. While the
Supreme Court has eliminated electoral funding as a permissible objective, 124
clashes and contradictions remain. Restrictions that screen frivolous candidates,
mitigate voter confusion and advance political stability, for example, also tend
to discourage serious candidates, dilute voter participation and interfere with an
ideally democratic political process. Incumbency likewise promotes stability,
but some would say at a high cost of stagnancy and governmental malaise. 125
121 See generally Loffredo, supra note 56, at 1287 ("[W]ealth-induced distortions of the
democratic process... systematically disadvantage and disenfranchise the poor as a
group -...
122 See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 1, at 1161 ("[l]n the American wealth primary,
large costs discourage candidacies by poor and working people and favor candidacies by the
wealthy and by incumbents.. .).
123 See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 20, at 287 ("[N]either wealth nor poverty may be
used to block meaningful participation by a group of citizens in the electoral process.").
12 4 In Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1972), the Court stated:
We... reject the theory that since the candidates are availing themselves of the primary
machinery, it is appropriate that they pay that share of the cost that they have
occasioned....
... [A] primary system designed to give the voters some influence at the
nominating stage should spread the cost among all of the voters in an attempt to
distribute the influence without regard to wealth.
125 Political analyst George Will has commented:
Members of Congress... have come to be seen as examples of people corrupted by
being insulated from competition and accountability, people committed to nothing much
other than their own continuation in office, people whose hold on their offices depends
on their manipulation of the power of their offices and the resources to which their
offices give them access.
WiLL, supra note 114, at 40-41.
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Like it or not, the same age-old dilemma that forces society to choose
somewhere between anarchy and order allows only an optimal approach to
ballot access. On balance, where should lines be drawn?
A. Comparing Chaos and Choice: Data from the States
Promising answers lie in the myriad experiments conducted across the
United States every two years. As discussed in the previous section, ballot
access laws vary from state to state. In an effort to understand how restrictions
affect access, I have catalogued primary states126 according to shared or
common ballot access restrictions. Tables 1 and 2 collect ballot access data
from the 1994 and 1996 congressional elections. 127 Table 1 separates those
states using fees, at least as an alternative, 128 into four groups: those charging
126 "Primary states" are those that require major parties to conduct elections in order to
identify their respective candidates antecedent to general elections for congressional office.
This includes forty-seven states. I have omitted Connecticut, Utah and Virginia from all
tabulations because they do not mandate primaries. Connecticut and Utah condition primaries
on pre-primary conventions, which act to screen out potential candidates. See 1996
ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 90-91 (describing Connecticut's system); id. at 160
("A candidate who receives more than 70% of the party convention vote [in Utah] is the
nominee. If no candidate achieves that majority, a primary election is held between the two
candidates receiving the highest number of votes."). Virginia allows the parties to choose
either elections or conventions. See id. at 162 ("Parties may choose to nominate by
convention or primary election."). Because the screening effect in Connecticut and Utah
distorts the number of candidates who run in the primaries, and because data from Virginia
indicates that primaries are seldom used, all three are excluded. I have chosen to include New
Mexico, which also uses pre-primary conventions, see supra note 8, because candidates can
still gain access to primaries by collecting additional signatures. See id.
12 7 Unless otherwise indicated, relevant fee and signature requirements did not change
for the 1994 and 1996 election cycles. Of course, where the signature requirement is
expressed as a percentage of registered voters, the raw numbers required might have changed
in particular states. For purposes of this study, I have assumed that such changes are de
minimus and therefore have ignored them in creating categories. Idaho changed its ballot
access requirements between the 1994 and 1996 elections. In 1994, a candidate had to pay a
$150 fee and supply 500 signatures. In 1996, a candidate could either pay a $300 fee or
supply 500 signatures. See 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 28, §§ 2 & 22 (addressing change).
New Mexico raised the number of additional signatures required to gain access to the primary
ballot in 1994 from 3 % of the party's voters in the district in the last gubematorial election to
4% in 1996. See 1995 N.M. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 124, § 16. Unless otherwise indicated, all
tabulations are distilled from FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N REPORT, FEDERAL ELECnoNs 94:
ELECTnON RESULTS FOR TBE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATwVES (1995)
[hereinafter "1994 ELrT-oNs REPORT"], and the 1996 ELECnONS REPORT, supra note 11.
12 8 Hawaii, Ohio and Pennsylvania, which require both fees and signatures, see supra
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more than $1336;129 those charging $1336 or less but more than $500;130 those
charging $500 or less but more than $100;131 and those charging $100 or
less. 132
note 11, are treated as signature states. In all three of these states, signature collection is more
onerous than paying the fees, justifying their treatment as signature states. Kentucky,
meanwhile, which requires a $500 fee supported by two signatures, see supra note 11, is
treated as a fee state. Idaho required both a $150 fee and 500 signatures in 1994. See supra
note 127. In 1996, however, Idaho alternatively required either a $300 fee or 500 signatures.
See id. For sake of consistency, Idaho is treated as if it alternatively required a $300 fee for
both the 1994 and 1996 elections. I recognize that Idaho's 1994 signature requirement likely
predominated over its fee, and therefore Idaho, like Hawaii, Ohio and Pennsylvania, could
logically be treated as a signature state for the 1994 election cycle. Rather than divide Idaho
between two different categories, however, I have chosen to include its two 1994 House seats
in the same fee category as its two 1996 House seats.
129 Five states are included in this category: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia and
Texas. See supra notes 13, 58 & 65. Alabama and Arkansas are included because fees
assessed by the parties fall into this range. In Alabama, both parties in 1996 assessed fees
equal to 2% of the congressional salary. In Arkansas, the Democratic party charged $5000 in
1996, while the Republican party charged $3500. New Hampshire, which charges $5000 but
reduces its fee to $50 if the candidate agrees to campaign spending limitations, see supra note
67, is excluded from all tabulations. Uncertainty surrounding whether candidates in New
Hampshire qualified by paying $5000 or $50 makes it difficult to say with any confidence that
New Hampshire should be catalogued as either charging more than $1336 or less than $100.
130 Eleven states fall into this category: California, Delaware, Kansas, Louisiana,
Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington and West
Virginia. See supra notes 12, 14, 58 & 62. Delaware allows parties to assess fees up to 1% of
the congressional salary. See supra note 62. In 1996, both parties assessed the full amount.
131 Six states fall into this category: Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada
and Wyoming. See supra notes 12-14.
132 Five states fall into this category: Alaska, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri and Oregon.
See supra notes 12-15 & 58. As a worst case scenario, I have included Indiana in this
category. Indiana charges neither a fee nor requires signatures. See supra note 15. Because
Indiana's figures do not differ significantly from those for Alaska, Maryland, Missouri and
Oregon, they have neither substantially inflated nor deflated the totals. Thirty-five of forty
primaries conducted in 1994 and 1996 were contested in Indiana, half with three or more
candidates. Indiana's candidate per primary ratio was just over three-and-one-third to one. See
1994 ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 127, at 64-67; 1996 ELECTIONS REPORT, supra note 11,
at 101-04.
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TABLE 1 _
FEE PRIMARIES CANDIDATES CONTESTS CONTESTS WITH 3 CANDIDATES PER
OR MORE PRIMARY
>$1336 300 467 106 48 1.56
(0.35) (0.16)
<$1336 416 725 169 78 1.74
> $500 (0.41) (0.19)
<. $500 96 175 35 21 1.82
> $100 (0.36) (0.22)
<$100 132 438 106 68 3.31
(0.80) (0.52)
Table 2 divides states using only signatures into three groups: those that
require at least 1000 signatures;' 33 those that require more than 100 signatures
but less than 1000; 134 and those that require 100 or less. 135
133 Nine states fall into this category: Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Wisconsin. See supra note 11. New
Mexico's change in the percentage of signatures required between 1994 and 1996, see supra
note 127, did not change the category in which it is listed. Whether one focuses on the
number of signatures needed to access pre-primary conventions or primaries in New Mexico,
the number exceeds 1000 and New Mexico's category remains the same. See supra note 106.
134 Seven states fall into this category: Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Rhode Island and Vermont. See supra note 11. I included Illinois notwithstanding the
fact that in 1996 two of forty primaries required more than 1000 signatures. See ILjmOIS
STATE BD. OF ELECONS, 1996 SIGNATuE REQuIREMET-U.S. CONGRESS (on file with
author). The Democratic primaries for District 1 and District 2 required 1098 and 1002
signatures, respectively. See id. The mean number of signatures in Illinois for 1996 was
below 600 signatures per primary. See id.
135 Four states are in this category: Tennessee, Hawaii, Ohio and Indiana. See supra
notes 11 and 15. Hawaii is unique in that it has a signature alternative to its signature
requirement. See HAw. REv. STAT. § 12-6(e) (1985) (signatures from 1/ of 1% of voters in
district; totaled between 1191 and 1253 in 1996). I have disregarded this alternative in favor
of the petition requirement of 25 signatures, which is coupled with a filing fee of $75. See
HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 12-5(a) & 12-6(b)(1) (1985). Because Hawaii's fee is so low,
moreover, I have treated it as a signature state. See supra note 128. One will note that Indiana
is also included in the tabulation for states charging $100 or less. See supra note 132. I have
included Indiana in the signature tabulation as a worst case scenario. Indiana is the only state
that has been included in two separate tabulations. Because these two tabulations are not
compared against each other, this redundancy causes no difficulties.
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TABLE2
SIGNATURES PRIMARIES CANDIDATES CONTESTS CONTESTS WITH CANDIDATES PER
3 OR MORE PRIMARY
> 1000 396 594 119 48 1.50
(0.30) (0.12)
< 1000 192 350 85 40 1.82
> 100 (0.44) (0.21)
< 100 160 395 98 51 2.47
1 1 (0.61) (0.32) 1
The data contained in Tables 1 and 2 includes the total number of primaries
studied, the total number of candidates who ran in these primaries, the number
and percentage of contested primaries, the number and percentage of primaries
with three or more candidates, and the ratio of candidates to each primary. The
ratio of candidates to primaries is material to whether access restrictions deter
frivolous candidacies and how well they serve this goal. If, for example, the
candidate per primary ratio in states with relatively open ballots is large, the
argument in favor of deterrence would appear more credible. From the other
side, the percentage of contested elections is relevant to self-determination, self-
realization and the spirit of competition. If percentages are high regardless of
the restrictions imposed, it would be hard to argue that restrictions interfere
with these goals. 136
Looking first to the signature states described in Table 2, those eight states
that require 1000 or more signatures collectively had less than one-third (30%)
of their 1994 and 1996 primaries contested. Only about one in ten (12%) of
these primaries had three or more candidates. On average, one and one-half
candidates ran in each primary, meaning that only three major-party candidates
ran for each congressional seat. 137 Primary ballots in states requiring between
100 and 1000 signatures had more candidates and larger percentages of
contested primaries. Close to half (44%) of the primaries in these seven states
were contested in 1994 and 1996, one-fifth (21%) with three or more
candidates. Almost two candidates (1.82), on average, ran in each primary.
The percentage of contested primaries and the candidate per primary ratio
increased again with those states requiring 100 or fewer signatures. More than
136 Cf. Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 1, at 1161 ("[Iln the American wealth primary,
large costs discourage candidacies by poor and working people... ; private money becomes
crucial... [which] ends up reducing competition, participation, and dialogue.").
137 Comparing this data to that for states using fees, one learns that requiring one-
thousand-plus signatures appears about as restrictive as requiring fees that surpass $2500. See
Table 1. States like Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia and Texas, which use fees between
$2500 and $10,020, have similar percentages and ratios.
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half (61%) of the primaries were contested, a third (32%) with three or more
candidates. Just under two-and-one-half candidates (2.47) ran in each primary.
A definite trend therefore emerges: more signatures correlates with fewer
contests and candidates.
Fee states experienced a similar inverse relation between the size of
restrictions and the volume of candidates and contests. As with signature states,
increased restrictions caused declines in candidate participation. Only about
one-third (35%) of the 1994 and 1996 primaries were contested in the five
states charging fees exceeding $1336. Roughly half of these contested primaries
(16% overall) had three or more candidates. The ratio of candidates to
primaries, meanwhile, was just more than one-and-one-half (1.56) to one.
Those states that charged between $500 and $1336, meanwhile, had primaries
contested 41% of the time, with almost one in five having three or more
candidates. Close to one and three-quarters (1.74) candidates, on average, ran
in each primary.
The candidate per primary ratio increased to 1.82 for the seven states
charging between $100 and $500. Though neither this increase, nor the slight
drop in contested elections, is alone significant, it reflects a continuing trend
toward increased candidate participation. Indeed, in states charging $100 or
less, the number of candidates running in each primary increased to almost
three-and-one-third (3.31). The percentage of contested elections jumped
dramatically to 80%. More than half of the primaries (52%) had three or more
candidates.
One learns from this data that both monetary restrictions and signature
support requirements are effective. In Indiana, for example, the only state to
charge no fee and impose no support requirement, the candidate per primary
ratio for the combined 1994 and 1996 elections was just over three-and-one-
third to one. 138 While this average was obviously not reduced by fees ranging
up to $100-Alaska, Maryland, Missouri and Oregon produced a similar
combined average-it was reduced precipitously by fees exceeding $100, as
well as virtually any signature requirement. Charging fees between $100 and
$500 brings the ratio down to just under two candidates per primary, while
requiring up to 100 signatures brings down the average to just under two-and-
one-half candidates per primary.
Increasing fees and signature support requirements beyond these
thresholds, however, appears to achieve no appreciable advantage, at least if
the concern is limiting the number of candidates on primary ballots to
manageable levels. A five-fold increase in fees from $500 to $2500 caused
participation rates to drop only one-quarter candidate per primary, from just
under two (1.82) to just over one-and-one-half (1.56) candidates in each
138 See supra note 132.
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primary. Because one would hope to have two candidates on each ballot
anyway, multiplying fees several times proves counterproductive. In terms of
discouraging frivolous candidacies, maintaining order, and minimizing voter
confusion, fees beyond $500 are both unnecessary and unduly stifling.
Even for those states that charge nominal fees of $100 or less, the ratio of
candidates to primaries is still only three-and-one-third (3.31) to one. 139 It is
difficult to understand how three or four candidates in any given primary causes
voter confusion or otherwise disrupts the political process. True, the likelihood
of runoffs is increased, at least if majority votes are required to win. 140 Half of
the primaries in jurisdictions charging $100 or less had three or more
candidates, compared to less than a quarter in the remaining fee states. The
problem with runoff elections, however, seems overstated. In 1994, less than
one-quarter of the primaries in the states charging $100 or less would have been
forced into runoffs by majority vote requirements. 141 Better yet, runoff
elections can be avoided in other ways, such as by relaxing the need for
majority votes or by running "blanket" or "open" primaries.142 In short,
139 Because the percentage of contested primaries is large, 80%, this figure is spread
fairly evenly among primaries. See Table 1. It is not that one primary has ten candidates and
three others are uncontested. Instead, the more common model would have two primaries
with four candidates apiece, one primary with three candidates, and one primary with two
candidates.
140 For states requiring 100 or fewer signatures this is not even an issue, since the
candidate to primary ratio is only 2.47 to one, and only 32% of the primaries had three or
more candidates. See Table 2. These numbers are not that different from those in states
requiring between 100 and 1000 signatures. See id.
141 In only 15 of 66 primaries did the winning candidate fail to receive a simple
majority. No runoffs were held in any of these states, however, because either majorities
were obtained in the primaries, see 1994 ELEioNs REPORT, supra note 127, at 32 (Alaska),
or a majority was not required. See id. at 64-67, 73-75, 87-89 & 113-14 (Indiana,
Maryland, Missouri and Oregon).
142 In a "blanket" primary system, candidates from all parties run together in the same
primary; those with the most votes, regardless of party affiliation, then qualify for the general
election. See 1996 ELECrIoNs REPORT, supra note 11, at 74, 107 (describing Alaska's and
Louisiana's systems). In an "open" primary, like that in Louisiana, "all candidates, regardless
of party affiliation, appear on the same ballot and all voters regardless of party affiliation may
vote for the candidate of their choice." Love v. Foster, 90 F.3d 1026, 1030 (5th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1243 (1997). Should a candidate receive a majority of the vote in the
open primary, that candidate wins the election. If not, those two candidates with the most
votes square off in the general election. See id. Post-general election runoffs are unnecessary.
So long as open or blanket primaries are timed properly, they pose no federal difficulties. See
Love v. Foster, 100 F.3d 413, 414 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (denying rehearing) ("[W]e
do not suggest that Louisiana may not retain its open primary system. One way it can retain
this system and avoid any conflict with the federal statute is to hold the open primary on
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charging fees in excess of $100 appears to be a lot of medicine for a minor, and
avoidable, difficulty. 143
Perhaps more importantly, dramatic increases in fees and signature
requirements cause the percentage of primaries contested to drop
significantly. 144 Eighty percent of the primaries were contested in states
Federal Election Day and provide for a runoff election between November and January when
the elected member of Congress takes office."); cf Martin Dyckman, Preserve the Primary
Rwwff Election, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, July 29, 1997, at 9A (arguing that if runoffs are
abolished, then "preference voting" should be adopted, where "voters would mark their
second choices at the same time they cast their first votes, rather than four weeks later.
Election computers would add second-choice votes to declare a winner when no one has a
majority of first-choice votes.").
143 In those states charging more than $1336 in 1994, only 7% of the primaries resulted,
or would have resulted (assuming a majority vote requirement), in runoffs. See 1994
ELECmONS REPORT, supra note 127, at 31-32, 34-35, 52-58 & 126-32 (reporting election
results for Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia and Texas). One must therefore concede that
a $2500 filing fee better avoids runoffs than a $100 fee. Still, one need not concede that the
cost (fewer choices) is justified by the gain (fewer runoffs). Whether a $100 fee or a $2500
fee, the percentage of nmoffs is still relatively low-less than 25%.
144 1 use "significantly" as a statistical term of art. The term is used in conjunction with
a statistical "z-test," which allows one to assess the likelihood that two samples were
randomly drawn from the same population. The analysis assumes that repeated samplings of a
given population will produce a normal distribution of data for that population. See WUIAM
M nmtEr.uLL & RIcARsD L. ScHEAFFE, MATHEmATcAL STATsncs wrrH APPICATIONS
325-38 (1973). Sampled data can then be tested against expected results to determine the
likelihood that the samples were selected naturally or randomly. See Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482, 496 n. 17 (1977) (describing the binomial distribution and relevance of standard
deviations); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.14 (1977). In short,
a statistical z-test uses a z-score, which is calculated by dividing the difference between the
two samples' percentages by the expected standard deviations for the samples, to identify a p-
value. See generally HERMAN J. Lomm & DONALD G. MCTAvISH, DESCRMMVE AND
INFERENiAL STAaTSTIcs: AN INTRODUCION 145-50 (4th ed. 1993). P-values are found using
a standard conversion table found in most statistics text books. See id. at 150. A p-value
basically stands for the likelihood that the two samples came from the same population.
Where the p-value is very low, say, less than 0.05 (5%), one is ordinarily comfortable
concluding that they did not. The differences between the samples are said to be statistically
"significant." Note that there is no magic to the 5% level. Although most sociologists use it,
others would require a greater degree of confidence. See Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical
Proof of Discrimination: Beyond "Damned Lies", 68 WASH. L. REV. 477, 486 (1993); D.H.
Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WAsH. L. REv. 1333, 1342-45
(1986). Where it is unknown which of the sampled percentages is to be larger, p-values are
calculated using a two-tailed analysis. A one-tailed analysis tests only whether a sample is
higher or lower than observed data, but not both. A two-tailed test, on the other hand,
analyzes whether samples are different, either being higher than the other. See MMDMENHALL
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charging $100 or less. Sixty-one percent of the primaries were contested in
states requiring 100 or fewer signatures. Only about one-third (35%) of the
primaries, meanwhile, were contested in those states charging more than
$1336-a difference that is statistically significant when compared with states
charging $100 or less. 145 Less than one-third (30%) were contested in states
requiring 1000 or more signatures-again a statistically significant difference
when contrasted with states requiring 100 or fewer signatures. 146 Rather than
maintaining order by minimizing frivolous candidacies, large fees and signature
requirements primarily eliminate choice. The one candidate eliminated from
each primary by extreme fees does not reduce the ballot from four to three or
even three to two; its principal effect, instead, is more akin to reducing the
ballot from two candidates to one.
Quite understandably, voter turnout suffers when choice is limited. This
truth is obvious for the primaries themselves, since uncontested elections either
produce no turnout147 or minimal voter interest. 148 It also translates, however,
to general elections, where states with the largest fees and signature
requirements, and lowest ratios of candidates-to-primaries, 149 also have the
smallest general election voter turnouts. In the 1996 general House elections,
for example, those five states charging more than $1336 had a composite voter
turnout of only 41% of their voting age populations. 150 Those states charging
& SCHEAFER, supra, at 336-37; LOETHER & MCTAvisH, supra, at 150. For purposes of this
Article, a two-tailed analysis has been used, and I have used p-values of 0.05 and less to
identify "significance." Z-scores equal to or greater than 1.96 generate p-values of 0.05 and
less using a two-tailed analysis and are thus considered significant. See LoETHE &
MCTAvLsH, supra, at 150.
145 When compared with states charging $100 or less, the z-score is 10.16, well beyond
the 1.96 needed to establish significance. See supra note 144.
146 When compared against states requiring 100 or fewer signatures, the z-score is 6.95,
again well beyond the needed 1.96. See supra note 144.
147 Many states, like Florida, do not require primaries where candidates run unopposed.
The unopposed candidate proceeds directly to the general election. See, e.g., 1996 ELEcrboNS
REPORT, supra note 11, at 92-95 (describing Florida's primary returns).
148 In Arizona, for example, unopposed candidates are required to run in the primary,
where voter participation is much smaller than that found in the general election. See 1996
ELECrIoNs REPORT, supra note 11, at 75-76. In Arizona's Third District in 1996, where both
major party candidates ran unopposed, the total turnout was only 75,895 voters, versus
263,445 in the ensuing general election. See id.
14 9 See Tables 1 and 2.
150 Unless otherwise indicated, turnouts are based on voters participating in the
November 5, 1996 general election for the U.S. House of Representatives. Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia and Texas cumulatively had 14,411,568 voters participate in this
election. See 1996 ELECTONs REPORT, supra note 11, at 74, 76, 95, 96 & 155. Together,
their voting age population totaled 35,151,000 in 1996. See Federal Elections Comm'n, Voter
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$100 or less, in contrast, had a voter turnout of almost 51%.151 Granted,
numerous variables undoubtedly factor into these differences, and I do not
pretend to offer anything close to what is necessary to properly study the
phenomenon. Still, one cannot ignore the fact that voters are more likely to
participate when given a choice among candidates. Popular ballots produce
more choice, which in turn leads to more voters in both primary and general
elections.
B. The Effect of Restrictions on Incumbency
Naturally, the beneficiaries of uncontested primaries are incumbents. One
might make a guarded argument that restrictive ballots are necessary to
perpetuate a measure of incumbency and stability in government. Tables 3 and
4 chart incumbency success rates in the 1994 and 1996 general congressional
elections by identifying the number of available seats, the number of
Registration and Turnout-1996 (http:l/www.fec.govlpagesl96to.htm) Lhereinafter "Voter
Registration and Turnout-1996"]. The cumulative number of registered voters in these five
states in 1996 totaled 26,270,064. See id. Measured against the number of registered voters,
the percentage of votes cast in 1996 was 55 %.
151 Alaska, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri and Oregon together cast 7,632,692 votes in
the 1996 House general elections. See 1996 ELECiONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 74, 104,
111, 122 & 144. The voting age population in these five states numbered 15,025,000 in 1996.
See Voter Registration and Turnout-1996, supra note 150. Measured against the number of
registered voters, which was 11,795,885 in these states in 1996, see id., the voter turnout was
65%. The difference in voter tanouts between states requiring 1000 or more signatures and
those requiring 100 or less is not as pronounced. States in the former category had a collective
turnout of 48%, measured against voting age population, while states in the latter category
had a collective turnout of 49% when measured against voting age population. States
requiring 1000 or more signatures, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania and South Dakota, had a composite voter turnout of
21,059,262, see 1996 ELrniONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 90, 108, 113, 117, 129, 136,
148 & 150, almost half of their collective voting age population of 43,872,000. See Voter
Registration and Turnout-1996, supra note 150. States requiring 100 or fewer signatures,
Hawaii, Indiana, Ohio, Tennessee and Wisconsin, had a composite turnout of 8,624,194
voters, see 1996 ELErONS REP ORT, supra note 11, at 97, 104, 142, 152 & 166, again
almost half of their collective voting age population of 17,646,000. See Voter Registration and
Turnout--1996, supra note 150. Measured against registered voters, the difference between
respective percentages is larger. States requiring 1000 or more signatures had a collective
turnout of 60% (18,908,935 actual voters divided by 31,763,035 registered voters) (excluding
Wisconsin whose figures were unavailable). See id. States requiring 100 or fewer signatures
had a 63% turnout (8,624,194 actual voters divided by 13,762,601 registered voters). See
1996 ELECnONS REPORT, supra note 11; Voter Registration and Turnout-1996, supra note
150.
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incumbents running, the number of incumbents opposed in their parties'
primaries, and the number of incumbents winning in general elections. Using
the same categories found in Tables 1 and 2, Tables 3 and 4 proffer evidence
that while popular ballot access correlates with reduced incumbency, it does not
threaten wholesale turnover in Congress.
TABLS _
FEES SFATS INXIMBEN5' NJMBNEIM OPPOSED % % OPPO)D % %
RUNNING WINNING IN WINNING RUNNING INCLMBETS TO
MMIAL PRIMARY SATS
_LECON
> $1336 150 126 124 22 93 17 84 83
s$1336 208 184 165 54 90 29 88 79
S5 M 48 39 35 S90 21 81 73
.$I0 66 55 51 33 93 69 83 77
Turning first to Table 3, in states charging more than $1336 incumbents
won 98% of the general elections in which they ran. For states charging $1336
or less, incumbency success rates dropped to between 90% and 93%. The
composite of all fee states charging $1336 or less produces an incumbency
success rate of 90%,152 which though high is still significantly less than
98%.153 The overall percentage of incumbents to seats, meanwhile, dropped
from 83% for states charging more than $1336 to 79% for those charging
between $500 and $1336. For states charging $500 or less, 154 only 75% of the
seats were won by incumbents. 155 While the rate running for re-election was
roughly the same regardless of ballot restrictions, 84% in states charging more
152 This is based on an accumulation of the totals for states charging between $1336 and
$500, between $500 and $100, and $100 or less. In this composite, incumbents won 251 of
278 elections in which they ran, or 90%. See Table 3.
153 Comparing the 90% success rate in states charging $1336 or less against the winning
percentage for incumbents in states charging more than $1336, 98%, the z-score is 3.88,
which is statistically significant. See supra note 144.
154 Combining the last two categories of states charging between $100 and $500, and
states charging $100 or less. See Table 3.
155 This percentage is based on 114 seats (48 in states charging $500 or less but more
than $100 and 66 in states charging $100 or less) and 86 successful incumbents (35 in states
charging $500 or less but more than $100 and 51 in states charging $100 or less). See Table
3.
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than $1336 versus 86% in those states charging less than $1336,156 incumbents
were challenged in primaries more than twice as often in states charging $1336
or less. 157
KGIN2ATUR M SEATS INCUMBENTS INCtJMBENTS OPPOSED % % 6%
RUNNING WINNING IN WINNING OPPOSED RUNNING INCUaErTS
GENERAL PRIMARY TO SEATS
_________ELECTION
_ 000 198 182 171 46 94 25 92 96
< 1000 96 79 73 27 92 34 82 76
> 100____ ____
! 00 66 71 94 90 4 o9
Table 4 presents a similar picture for signature states, though for perhaps
different reasons. The success rate for incumbents dropped from a high of 94%
in states requiring at least 1000 signatures to a low of 90% in states requiring
100 or fewer signatures. The percentage of seats occupied by incumbents,
moreover, fell from 86% in states requiring 1000 or more signatures to 78%
for those states requiring less, 158 a statistically significant difference. 159 While
the drop in incumbency might be expected given incumbents' reduced success
rate in states with more open access, it seems to correlate more closely with the
percentage of incumbents seeking re-election, which sank from a high of 92%
in states requiring more than 1000 signatures to 85% in those states requiring
fewer signatures. 160 The difference in incumbency running rates is statistically
156 This figure is a composite of those for three categories of states charging less than
$1336. See Table 3. In these combined states, 278 incumbents ran for 322 seats.
157 Incumbents were challenged 17% of the time in states charging more than $1336.
See Table 3. In states charging $1336 or less, incumbents were challenged 43% of the time.
The latter percentage is based on 278 incumbents running (184 in states charging between
$1336 and $500, 39 in states charging $500 or less but more than $100, and 55 in states
charging $100 or less) with 119 being opposed (29 in states charging between $1336 and
$500, 21 in states charging $500 or less but more than $100, and 69 in states charging $100
or less). See Table 3.
158 This figure results from combining those states requiring 100 or fewer signatures
with those requiring between 100 and 1000. See Table 4. In this composite, 176 seats were
won by 137 incumbents, 73 of 96 in states requiring between 100 and 1000 signatures and 64
of 80 in states requiring 100 or fewer signatures.
159 The z-score is 2.15, which is statistically significant. See supra note 144.
160 This figure is a result of combining states requiring between 100 and 1000 signatures
with those requiring 100 or less. See Table 4. In this composite, 150 of 176 incumbents ran
again, 79 of 96 in states requiring between 100 and 1000 signatures and 71 of 80 in states
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significant. 161
Even recognizing the importance of continuity in American government,
one is hard-pressed to argue that an incumbency success rate hovering around
90% is perilously low. 162 The fact is that incumbents win, and win often,
whether fees are set at $100, $500 or $10,000. Incumbents hardly need the
protection offered by restrictive access fees and signature requirements. On the
other hand, a credible argument can be made that an incumbency success rate
closely approaching 100% is too high. 163 Accountability is, in large part,
premised on a possibility of removal. As it now stands in many states with
extreme qualification requirements, one's risk of removal is de mininus.
Anything that moderates a 100% success rate ought to be embraced as a plus
for truly representative (and accountable) government.
C. Empirical Coda
Measured against the data contained in Tables 1 and 2, deterrence cannot
be considered a sound reason for imposing filing fees beyond the $500 level.
Candidate participation rates from the 1994 and 1996 primary elections indicate
that $500 filing fees have approximately the same deterrent value as fees in
excess of $1336.164 Likewise, requiring more than 1000 signatures achieves
little more than requiring 100 signatures in terms of winnowing the ballot.165
Rather than deterring a plethora of potentially frivolous candidates, the
over-regulation found in most states unduly restricts choice. Competition, self-
realization and self-determination are all premised on choice. Restrictions that
cause fewer than two candidates, on average, to run, and which cause a
preponderance of primaries to be uncontested, are inconsistent with all of these
values. Additionally, large fee and signature requirements tend to alienate less-
affluent candidates from the ballot. It is for these reasons that fees optimally
should not exceed $100166 and support requirements should not exceed 100
requiring 100 or fewer signatures.
161 The z-score is 2.04, which is statistically significant. See supra note 144.
162 George Will has noted that "in the entire history of the House of Representatives the
success rate for incumbents seeking re-election has rarely fallen below 70 percent. Indeed, it
has been lower in only seven of the 102 elections: 1842, 1854, 1862, 1874, 1890, 1894 and
1932." WILL, supra note 114, at 77. Moreover, "in the twenty-one elections from 1950
through 1990 the rate has exceeded 90 percent seventeen times and has never fallen below the
86.6 rate of 1964." Id.
163 See id. (arguing that incumbency success rates are too high in the House of
Representatives).
164 See Table 1.
165 See Table 2.
166 See Table 1.
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signatures. 167 Restrictions at or below these levels allow maximal competition
while at the same time still achieving a significant deterrent effect.
Elections are expensive, of course, and fees raise money, not insignificant
concerns in austere times. As a normative matter, however, I agree with the
Supreme Court that socializing the cost of elections over a large tax base is
preferable to forcing user fees on candidates. 168 Large fees send the wrong
message; rather than reinforce the electorate's already negative perception of
the political process, the better approach is to absorb costs and maintain free
and open elections. Fees are useful to other ends, but there are better methods
to replenish the public fisc.
Any lingering fears over precipitous declines in success rates of incumbents
ought to be assuaged by the figures contained in Tables 3 and 4. Incumbents
will not unduly suffer at the hands of popular ballots. They may be at greater
risk of losing future elections, but that, it would seem, is the price of
democracy. Indeed, given incumbents' recent success rates, greater risk ought
to be considered a societal good. After all, something is to be said for fresh
faces and perspectives in government. In any event, far from forcing a
complete turnover in the House, relaxed access requirements ought to simply
infuse greater accountability in government.
1II. CONCLUSION
Needed ballot access reform can be implemented in any one of three ways.
First, courts can make use of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to strike
down those restrictions exceeding $1336 and 2000 signatures. Second, state
legislatures might act to reduce their access requirements to the optimal levels
urged here. Third, Congress could pass legislation that sets the permissible
outer contours for access to federal ballots across the nation.
None of these presents any momentous constitutional concerns. At least
since Marbury v. Madison,169 courts have been defining constitutional rights.
States, meanwhile, are delegated the authority to regulate the "Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives" by Article
I, section 4 of the Federal Constitution. 170 This same grant, in turn, affords to
Congress the power to "at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations." 171 It is obvious that both the states172 and Congress can regulate
167 See Table 2. This figure is on the edge, since it results in only 2.47 candidates per
primary and 61% of the primary elections being contested.168 See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147-49 (1972).
169 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
170 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
171 Id.
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ballot access for federal elections. 173
Because judicial control is plodding and cumbersome-and likely to
produce only marginally satisfactory results-legislation is preferred. The
policy question is whether local control, and local autonomy, ought to trump a
nationally set standard which encourages uniformity in federal elections. The
preferred approach, I believe, is for Congress to set permissible parameters for
primary ballot access across the United States. States should not be allowed to
exceed set dollar and signature figures, though they should be provided the
option of requiring less. The relevant maxima should approximate $100174 and
100 signatures, with the states retaining authority to choose a singular signature
approach. Should a state opt for a fee, of course, a signature alternative (or
waiver for indigency) would be required. State restrictions exceeding stated
amounts would be pre-empted as inconsistent with federal standards. 175
Only one-fifth of the states currently abide by the normative
172 States that are covered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act presumably will be forced to
preclear changes to their filing fees with the Attorney General. See Morse v. Republican
Party of Va., 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996) (holding that a party's imposition of a delegate fee is
subject to preclearance); Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 40 (1978)
(holding that the board's rule requiring that candidates take unpaid leaves of absence are, like
filing fees, subject to the preclearance requirement of section 5) (citing U.S. COMM'N ON
CiViL RIGHTS, THE VOTNG RIGHTs Acr: TEN YEARs AFrER 134-37 (1975)). So long as a
state decreases its fees and signature alternatives, one, I think, can safely assume that
preclearance would be forthcoming.
173 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 123 (1970) ("In short, the Constitution
allotted to the States the power to make laws regarding national elections, but provided that if
Congress became dissatisfied with the state laws, Congress could alter them."). The
Qualifications Clause of Article I might present an obstacle to both congressional and state
regulation of ballot access, but would only prove relevant if regulation became so burdensome
as to amount to an additional qualification. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779
(1995), and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), have interpreted Article I to prevent
the states and Congress from imposing qualifications other than age, citizenship and
residence. However, because even the most draconian of restrictions imposed by the state
have yet to be deemed impermissible qualifications, it is unlikely that any serious challenge
can be made to the relaxed restrictions proposed here.
174 Rather than a stated dollar amount, Congress might understandably choose a
percentage of the congressional salary. One-tenth of one percent, which amounts to $133.60
under the 1996 schedule, is a close approximation.
175 In order to avoid Tenth Amendment concerns, Congress should simply set these
standards and pre-empt state regulations to the contrary. Ordering states to set specified
standards would likely run afoul of federalism concerns. See Printz v. United States, 117 S.
Ct. 2365 (1997) (holding that the federal government cannot force local law enforcement
officials to conduct background checks for arms sales); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992) (holding that the federal government cannot force state to take title to waste).
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recommendations pressed in this Article. Hence, the changes urged here might
seem a bit drastic to some. Remember, however, that many today advance
much more draconian revisions to the electoral landscape. Term limits,
campaign finance reform-these are serious changes. Compared to these
changes, the suggestions urged here are mere tinkerings-tinkerings that might
make a difference nonetheless.
